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INTRODUCTION 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 can be described as a water-
shed in the history of relationships between the United 
States and her two. Western allies, Britain and France. 
Especially is this true of Britain's position. By common 
conset it is agreed that two World Wars had weakened Bri-
tain; her Empire dwindled to a few possessions, but she 
nevertheless retained much of the prestige and influence 
attributable formerly to her stature as an Imperial power. 
November 1956 coJlapsed those myths of British power. 
·Her action in unison with France and Israel in attacking 
Egypt and her subsequent withdrawal under, particularly, 
American pressure demonstrated for all to see how hollow 
were the foundations upon which she attempted.to support 
a line of policy as an equal but independent partner of 
the United States. 
The extent of a state's power lies as far as it is 
possible for her to exercise control of events in a spe-
cific areaj influencing the course of those events so as 
to bring about an acceptable conclusion in line with her 
overall aims and desires. This Britain was not able to do 
in the Middle East. From the time of her withdrawal from 
Palestine and the gradual extension of American influence 
in the Eastern Mediterranean in Britain's place, it was 
clear that Britain was losing that necessary element of power. 
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From: the Baghdad Pact, which was American in innova-
tion and direction, through the drama of the Egyptian-
Czechoslovakian arms deal to the withdrawal of Western aid 
for Nasser's particular project of the Aswan Dam, American 
policy held sway. The pact was an American idea and domi-
nated by her. The loan was stimulated in December 1955 by 
the possibility of' long range American assistance. The 
... 
withdrawal was a unilateral American act, Britain being 
informed but not consulted. The withdrawal was a diploma-
tic warning to Egypt by Dulles, another slap at British 
prestige for Eden. 
But diplomacy·is not the only scene. The persona-
, li ties of Dulles, Nasser, ·and Eden cross at a time ill-
begotten to see a peaceful outcome in the deliberations of 
a lawyer, a nationalist leader, and a diplomat thinking in 
terms of some twenty years earlier. Each spoke in, dif-
ferent terms on the same subject and thus inevitably pro-
duced misunderstanding and discord. 
This then is the situation, the development of which 
is narrated in this thesis. Of France and Israel and their 
part in the crisis only a small part has been included -
those events dealing directly with and relating to the 
problems mentioned above. 
Each subdivision o:f this c·risis is worthy of a whole 
book, if justice is to be done to each. In this thesis 
lie a few ideas. ' 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE BAGHDAD PACT 
• Britain's position in the Middle East had been of~ 
long standing but a real decline of her power had come 
about a~er 1945, not only in the Middle East and the 
Eastern Meditteranean, as evidenced by her position in 
Greece and her withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, but in 
many other areas~ of the world. Since 1945 Britain has 
been retreating from he~ colonial and quasi-colonial 
possessions. Her successful attempt to hold on to the 
Suez base until June 1956 was only a carry-over from her 
former position. As one writer has put it: " •.• England 
remained for ten years the strongest Power in the Middle 
East, but by default and on borrowed strength. 111 Her 
strength was underwritten by the United States. When 
that keystone was withdrawn, the appearance of British 
power collapsed. 
Much of the British position in the Middle East was 
not viewe favourably by the Americans. It seemed as if 
Britain was merely using American support for her inte-
.. 
rests while in Britain the reverse appeared true - that 
the United States was only utilizing the British posi-
tion for her own ends. 2 In fact there was, of course, 
an element of truth in both these positions. Britain's 
declining strength and America's increasing power, which 
necessitated her gr.owing dominance i:n policy making, 
3 
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almost inevitably were .to meet in a clash of ·differences. 
This is what occured in October and November of 1956. 
But until that time Britain's aim was to reestablish 
herself as protector of the Middle East. Bevin's at-
tempt to give over Greece, Turkey, and Iran to American 
care was the first poBt-war manifestation of this move. 
But when Britain left Palestine, having enabled the new 
Jewish state of Israel to emerge, her influence with the 
Arabsstates took a headlong plunge. From this position 
she never really recovered, even though through such in-
struments as the Baghdad Pact and gradual withdrawal from 
the Suez Canal Base and movement of her Middle East head-
quarters to Cyprus she attempted to hold her increasingly 
faltering position. 
In July of 1954 an agreement was signed between Egypt 
and Britain regarding the Suez Canal Base.! This base 
was the largest military installatio~ in the Middle East. 
An area described by Eden as a "tangled mass of work-
shops and railways ••• the size of Wales•• 4 was the main 
centre of British power· in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
But the agreement was heralded by internal events in.Egypt, 
which were to bode no good for British Middle Eastern po-
licy. In the end of July 1952 the Egyptian Society of 
Free Officers had deposed King Farouk of Egypt and under 
the leadership of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had set up 
a new government in Egypt under martial law. A month and 
4 
a half later, Major General Mohammed Naguib was declared 
Premier of Egypt by the Revolutionary Council, and within 
less than a year Naguib was to be proclaimed President of 
" /? 
Egypt. The military junta which was behind Nagui,b was 
soon to become dissat-1.sfied, and on,,18 April 1954 Colonel 
Nasser replaced Major General Naguib as the Egyptian 
Premier; he was to become Egypt's President on 14 Novem-
ber 1954, when Naguib was placed under house arrest. Ap-
parently Naguib had been "restrained and civilized" in 
some of his policies, which did not coincide with some of 
Nasser's views and thus was ousted by the latter. 5 In 
October 1954 Nasser was able to take over and carry the 
army with him, when an attempt had been made on his life 
by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood for which Naguib was 
blamed. 
Nass er' s aim was to remove the British from Egypt. 
The presence of British troops in Suez was intolerable 
for a growing and nationally articulate Egypt. 6 The very 
fact that there were British forces in the Suez Canal 
Zone, no matter how they actually interfered in Egypt's ~ 
affairs, was an affront t.o the Egyptians. The troops were 
there and could interfere in the last resort. It meant 
that in Egypt was a force stronger than that held by the 
sovereign government. Should a major conflict arise, it 
would be Britain's interests, not Egypt's, which would 
decide the issue. 
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Matters in the direction of the removal of British· 
troops had been taking place for some years now. In 
December 1952 the British had decided to move their 
centre of operations in the Middle East from the Suez 
Canal Zone to Cyprus. Part of the reason was that Greece 
and Turkey had lately become members of NATO, and thus 
their entry, according to Eden, affected Britain's stra-
tegic deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean area.I 
Early in 1953 Britain had in mind certain proposals to 
make to the Egyptian government. These included a phased 
withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, the maintenance 
of the Suez Canal Base with re-access to it in times of 
war, a joint~Anglo-Egyptian air defence system, Egypt's 
participation in a Middle Eastern defence organization, 
and a programme of assistance to Egypt sponsored by both 
Britain and the United States.8 It was the fourth requi-
site, the participation of Egypt in a defence system, which 
was to be the stumbling block for Britain. 
The Egyptians argued that agreement on withdrawal 
should occur first and the Middle Eastern defence system 
should be discussed a~erwards. Neither was Egypt willing 
to see American participation in the scheme. In fact by 
the middle of 1953, Jlh.O Dulles visited the Middle East, 
it became apparent that he was thinking in terms of an 
American supervised defence system, rather than a British 
inclined organization. Dulles said: "There is in the 
6 
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area generally a vague desire to have a collective secu-
rity system. But no such system can be imposed from with-
out."9 This, if anything, was a direct strike at Britain, 
who was trying to weld her withdrawal from Egypt to an 
Egyptian alliance by which she could legally return to 
the area if her interests were threatened. But Cairo w·as 
not to be in favour of an American or a British defence 
system. 
On 27 July 1954 Britain agreed to withdraw troops '2 
stationed in the Suez Canal area, and on 19 October an 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the withdrawal of troops from 
the area was signed. The pact of 27 July was interuled to 
establish "Anglo-Egyptian relations as a new basis of 
mutual understanding and firm friendship" •10 It was. to 
be valid for seven years. Section A of Article 4 stated: 
. 
In the event of an armed attack by an outside 
power on Egypt or any country which at the 
date of signature of the present agreement is 
a party to the treaty of joint defense between 
Arab League states (Egypt 9 Syria 9 Lebanon 9 Saudi Arabia 9 Jemen 9 Jordan 9 Ir~q 9 Libya) or 
on Turkey~ Egypt will afford such facilities 
as may be necessary in order to place the 
fsuez Canal] base on a war footing and to ope-
rate it effectivelyo These facilities include 
the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of 
what is strictly indispensable for the above 
mentioned purposes. 
In addition Her Majesty's Government was to withdraw her 
troops from the area within twenty months of the signing 
of the agreement. 
The signing of the accord of !9 October 1954 simply 
. .., 
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confirmed the above decisions but also added that the 
Suez Canal should be run in harmony with the 1888 Conven-
tion, which had guaranteed freedom of navigation of the 
waterway. 
The agreement confinned Nasser's desire to be rid 
of the British; and the absence of the British would allow 
him to take Egypt along a path between East and West, 
yeilding to neither and utilizing each bloc in Egypt's 
own interests. Instead of joining any Western alliance, 
Egypt was to attempt to maintain an independent line and 
establish leadership ov,er the Arab world. The Baghdad 
Pact with the eventual adherence of Britain and partly of 
the United States confirmed Nasser's view, that this was 
a scheme to assert Great Power status in an area he thought 
should be controlled for the Arabs and by the Arabs under 
Egyptian guidance.12 The very fact that this Western 
sponsored treaty hinged on the participation of Turkey and 
Iraq at once caused Nasser to compete with the latter for 
control of the Arab nations. This was confirmed on 25 
April 1954, when the United States extended unconditional 
military aid to Iraq to strengthen the Iraqi army. The· 
Egyptian government would view such aid as detrimental 
to her own interests. 
~ Nasser was determined to widen his area of influence. 
On 11 June 1954 it was announced that Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia had agreed to pool defenee and military resources. 
. . 
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In Febrt1ary 1955 negotiation were begun bp Egypt which led 
to an agreement on 6 March to set up an Egyptian-Syrian- , 
Saudi Arabian Joint Council under the Egyptian Minister 
of War, Abdel Hakim Amer. On 7 June King Saud offered 
full military and economic support to Egypt against Isra-
el. But in spite of the extended and tangled web of 
inter-Arab agreements which Nasser was building up, the 
·, 
significant fact is that when the showdown with Israel 
came in October 1956, none of the other Arab nations 
moved to help Egypt beyond confirming their solidarity 
with that state and confining themselves to protestations 
against the British-French-Israeli attack upon·· Egypt and 
support of Nasser's n~tionalzation of the Suez Canall Co-
pany in July 1956.13 
As far as Western policy was concerned, the begin~ 
ning of what came to be known as the Baghdad Pact was set 
in motion with the signing of a mutual defence treaty be-
tween Iraq and Turkey against Communist aggression in the 
Middle East on 24 February 1955. As has been noted, dur-
ing Dulles• tour of the area in 1953 he had hinted that 
the United States would have looked favourably on a treaty 
with the aim of stemming Communist advance, and America 
had contributed to the military build-up of both coun-
tries. The treaty was not the first of its kind, having 
been prefaced·by a mutual defence alliance between Turkey 
and Pakistan in April 1954. But as far as the :Baghdad 
.,; 
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Pact was concerned, the signature of Iraq brought the 
Pact firmly into the Middle East. \ 
One writer has pointed out that the development of 
· · 14 
the Pact was "100% indigenous in its growth.," He con-
tends that: 
After Dulles threw out the original suggestion, 
Turkey took the ball and put it in play. When 
the two=nation alliance was enlarged at Baghdad 
it was a surprise to the State Department as 
well as to Nasser ••• nl5 
How much of a surprise it was to the State Department 
depends upon its expectations at the time. Certainly 
it must have been aware that Dulles would be in favour 
and had taken steps to encourage the idea. Especially 
after the construction of SEATO in 1954, the gap in the 
Middle East of· a defensive wall against any southern ex-
pansion by Russia see~ed all the more incongruous. Dulles 
seemes to have "strongly encouraged the first move", 16 ac-
cording to another observer, in what beca.me the Baghdad 
Pact. Dulles also encouraged Britain to join the treaty, 
which she did, expecting the United States to follow.17 
~ut this was not to be until after the Suez crisis, and 
even then America did not join~fully. 
Other authorities agree that it was Dulles who sti-
mulated and coached the Middle East adherents of the 
treaty into action. · Finer has written: 
With vigor and persistence, Dulles continued to 
thrust forward his plan for a mjlitary alliance 
between Britain and the northern Middle Ea.stern·.--. 
' /,1( 
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countries, in which it was widely understood 
America would participate. The gier was Dul-
les's invention and initiative .1 
Eden states that the origin of the Pact was in pa.rt 
British policy in as much as she too was concerned along 
with Dulles at the "gap" in the defence system. 19 There-
fore Eden was "delighted to. ;hear" thqt at the end of 1954 
Nuri al-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, was working on 
a plan to strengthen the Arab League with the inclusion-: 
of Turkey and the help of the United Kingdom and the Uni-
ted States. 
But among others, Nasser was opposed to the idea. 
In a discussion with Eden in Cairo early in 1955, Nasser, 
although declaring his sympathy and interest were with 
the West, nevertheless said that the Turko-Iraqi pact was, 
/ 
\ because of its bad timingl and unfortunate content, liable 
.1 
to "set back the development of effective collaboration 
'-
with the West by the Arab States". 20 Eden dismisses this 
with the remark that he was ''fami·liar with this plea; i-t 
is never the right time for some." But Ed en acknowledges 
also that no doubt Nasser was well aware that the intru-
sion.of Iraq in this matter would all the more jeopardize 
his long term ambitions to head the Arab states. For a 
diplomat of Eden's stature, it still seems that his ap-
.,, 
parent dismissal of Nasser's attitude towards the timing 
of the pact was a rather short-handed method of dealing 
with another state whose future was intimately involved 
( 
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with the security of the area. If indeed this highlights 
the British Prime Minister's attitude toward Egypt and her 
{\ 
problems, then the eventual outcome of British-Egyptian 
relations is not at all surprising. The pact was one of 
the more important reasons which eventually drove Egypt 
to Russia for arms, thereby creating a condition where 
·western-aid for the Aswan Dam would be withdrawn and even-
tually leading to Egypt's take-over of the Canal Company 
..._ 
and the attack by Britain, France, and Israel. 
Egypt also saw the pact in another light. Writing 
in 1955 one American author put it this way. 21 To secure 
the pact, the West "found it necessary to alienate almost 
every Arab leader outside Iraq", which consequently threw 
the anti-Iraq wing of the Arab League into Russia's em-
brace. " ••• The Near East is today ( 1955] more than ever 
a •quivering morass' -- in the phrase of the London Eco-
nomist -- of strife, mistrust and anti-Western agitation:.•• 
Al though it might not be true to say th.j:it all those in· 
4 4 the Middle East outside of the pact rushed under the 
Russian wing, certainly it is partly true for Egypt. 
Elsewhere similar opinions were expressed. "In 
pressing the Baghdad Pact," wrote one correspondent, "un-
eer the illusion that we were creating strength to resist 
Soviet expansion, we have been arming one nation against 
the other within the Middle East." 2 2 
It is generally conceded then that the establishment 
12 
of the Northern Tier system encouraged by both America 
..... ~· 
and Britain was not to solve the problems of the Great 
Powers in the area. Was it possible to construct a pact 
capable of both holding back any Russian expansion and at 
the same time trying to keep the Arab states undivided? 
Or.should the latter question be struck out by suggesting 
that British policy expecially was concerned not with 
unity of the Arab powers but with disunity in order that 
Britain thereby might forward her own designs and foster 
her own favourites? 
Humbaraci has suggested that there were many obstacles 
to the establishment of a healthy defence system in the 
Middle East. 23 Firstly, he puts the desire of Britain to 
t 
maintain a paternal influence in the area. With waning 
power and the attitude towards Egypt and the Egyptians 'i1:._ 
which had grown over the last seventy-five years, British 
-~ policy had been paternal. To try to reassert this power 
in the face of vigorous nationalism, especially on Egypt's 
part, would be difficult. Secondly, the policy of grant-
ing arms for internal security and to support pro-Western 
governments was not likely to enhance Britain in the eyes 
of states like Egypt and Syria. This is demonstrated by 
the attitude of those states of both Israel and Iraq, who 
had been given Western arms. Thirdly, there were the local 
rivalries for Arab leadership and Britain's role in these 
stru.ggles. Britain was never an "innocent spectator" in~ 
13 
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these conflicts with her policy of ~atching the Hashemite 
family against the Saudis and Egypt. 24 Then there was 
the West's use of Israel to upset the Arabs. The very 
fact that Israel had been founded with the assistance of 
the West and aided by Western arms was enough to set the 
· Arabs against further Western encroachment in the area. 
Ftlrthermore, at this time some members of the Arab League 
could turn to Russia for arms to support their fight 
against Israel. By 1955 the Soviet Union had extricated 
herself from her somewhat embarrassing support of the 
Zionist cause of pre-1948. She had given arms to the Jews 
in an effort to help them fight the British and the Arabs. 
By 1955 Russia had denounced the Israelis and therefore 
0, 
succeeded in gaining a certain amount of amity with the 
Arabs. [\ 
The mention of the Soviet Union brings to mind another 
great barrier to the united Arab front against Communism. 
Although the Arabs gradually learned the implications of 
the dangers of full commitment to either side in the cold 
war, they were not as apprehensive of Russia and Communism 
as was the West. To the Arabs, the Soviet Union and Ru.s-
sain troops were too far away, while the British were 
still present in Egypt until June 1955. Fllrthermore Bri-
tain still had interests in Jordan and Iraq and also 
maintained protectorates in the ArA.bian Peninsula. With 
'(~ 
the exceptions of Iraq and Turkey· (the two members of the 
14 
·' 
Baghdad Pact) none of >he other Middle Eastern states 
had common boundaries with Russia and had not felt undue 
pressure from the Soviet Union against their interests. 
To a certain extent also there may have been some 
distaste over the role of Turkey in the defensive agree-
ment. As Humbaraci notes, "No one likes to be gendarmed, 
least o:f all the Arabs by the Turks." 25 Finally and most 
importantly, there was the factor of Anglo-American ri-
valry. The thesis of this paper suggests that the main· 
reason for the calamity of November 1956 was just this 
point. The rivalry occured in the views of the two states 
of this defensive alliance. Perhaps naturally enough each 
state wanted the alliance in her favour and wanted it to 
be used to forward her own ends as well as serve the lar-
ger purpose of defence against encroachment from the north. 
The following ha.e been written about ·che time since the 
United States arose as a great power: 
The clash between British and American interests 
has been in evidence all over the world, but. 
nowhere has it had more disastrous results ·than 
in the Middle East 9 where it played directly 
into the hands 6of both Moscow and the extreme nationalistso2 
Hourani has written: "Who rules the Middle East rules 
~ the world; and he who has interests in the world is bound 
to concern himself with the Middle East. 1127 The period 
from 1945 to 1956 saw the definite demise of Britain and 
the rise of the United States. In this case necessarily 
15 
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American interests were to decide the fate of differences 
I 
among the Atlantic powers in the Middle East. 
The Baghdad Pact was to evoke considerable trouble 
for the British. Or at least Britain was to attribute 
her problems as stemmjng from this pact. In October 
1955 Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister, visited 
Cairo. Finer writes, claiming Egyptian sources, that 
Lloyd agreed not to enlist more Arab nations into the 
Baghdad Pact on .the condition Egypt would stop anti-
British propagg,nda "which was widespread and almost homi- . 
cidal in character." 28 
Through Nasser's intrigues in Jordan, he had subse-
quently seeured the dismissal of Sir John Bagot Glubb 
Pasha, who had bu±lt and led Jordan's Arab Legion, a 
first rate fighting force. On the day of Glubb's dismis-
sal, Lloyd was on a second visit to Nasser, and his ground 
was taken from under him by the Egyptian success. In 
1955 Hugh Massingham wrote in The New Republic: "Glubb 
Pasha stood in the way of Egyptian ambitions to create 
a united Arab army under Egyptian leadership. 1129 Britain's 
reaction, once she recovered from the shock, proceeded to 
blame the Americans and the State Department. It was the 
United States who was "responsible for foisting the ill 
conceived Baghdad Pact upon the British, and it is the 
Baghdad Pact that has sparked off the crisis. n30 In addi-
tion Massingham suggests that British charges against the 
:· .{: 
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United States included aecusations that American Varma to 
Saudi Arabia had been inflaming public opinion in Jordan. 
Here is another example of the division between British 
and Americam interests in the Middle East. But the main 
point is that in conclusion Massingham states: "No wonder 
the Russians are chuckling. Their arms are piling up at 
the docks at Alexandria, their experts are arriving in 
Cairo; the opportunities for mischief seem to be limit-
less." 
It must be remembered that this oceured after Egypt 
had signed ·an agreement exchanging Egyptian cotton for 
Czechoslovakian arms oni 27 September 1955. But it might 
not be quite correct to describe the Russian attitude to 
what had been going on in the "Arab East" in terms of 
"chuckling" and "mischievous" as Massingham has. Also, a 
policy of "tactful mischief" has been ascribed to Ru.ssian 
action in the Middle East during this period by other 
writers.31 This is too simple a view of Russia's inter-
pretation of the problems of the area as far as her inte-
rests were concerned. For many years, even under Czarist 
rule, the Soviet Union had attempted to become a Middle 
Eastern power. The factor of geography and greater power 
considerations did little to change Russian desires and 
aims over the years including the policies of post-revo-
lutionary Russia. Particularly after 1945, with Britain's 
declining influence as a factor, the Soviet Un!on was 
-'--:t - .. - • :1-WI' 
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eager to gain; a toeh~ld in this part of the world. The 
emergence of the Baghdad Pact was a direct threat to Rus-
sain interests, if she were to maintain her Great Power 
status, especially when the United States began to take 
an ever increasing interest in the Arab world. Although 
the Soviet Union had no need of such commodities as oil 
from the Arabs, she could and·~did maintain· an interest, 
which gradually became strengthened as the Western powers 
split over issues and thus left room for Russia's court-
ing of countries such· as Egypt. and Syria. But Russian 
interest was more likely stimulated by the threat which 
the Northern Tier group posed to her, rather than by an 
aim to construct a system of subversive plots to over-
throw Arab governments and replace them with satellite 
style puppet governments. 
Professor Geoffry Barraclough has written: 
To treat every Russian move in this area with 
suspicion as part of a deep laid plot for im-
perialist expansion not only implies mis-
~judgement of plain geo-Jp-.Oli tical facts, but 
creates an atmosphere of conflict.32 
It would be as logical to expect Russia to be uninterested 
in what goes on in Egypt and Iran, Barraclough suggests, 
as to expect the United States to ignore what goes on in 
Mexico or Panama. The Baghdad Pact was clearly aimed at 
the Soviet Unio~ and therefore one of the main factors, 
which caused Russia to seek loopholes in the heretofore 
Western controlled area. And the Soviet Union responded 
18 
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to this threat both diplomatically, as we shall'see with 
the arms deal and the Aswan High Dam issue, as well as 
with propaganda. 
"Commentator," writing in Moscow's International 
.. 
Affairs o:f 1956, stated that "President Gamal Abdel Nas-
~er quite rightly branded the Baghdad Pact as a prison 
for the peoples of the Middle East. n33 Syria had over-
come efforts by the West to get her into "the.aggressive 
Baghdad Alliance", while Nasser, "that outstanding states-
man of the Arab East," had succeeded on June 23, 1956 in 
h·aving seen the last British troops leave Egyptian soil.3 4 
But the West was trying to maintain dominance over the 
Arabs and was trying to impose unequal treaties and 
agreements on the Middle East, probably with "mil" as the 
main attraction. The Russian writer said that the United 
States joined only the economic committee of the Baghdad 
Pact "to utilize the bloc as an instrument of colonial 
expansion in the Middle East." . (In fact the United 
States joined the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact 
on 18 April 1956 and on the next day set up military lia-
son with the Pact members and joined the "commjttee to 
fight subversion". )35 
.. 
Russia in her concern for her interests began to 
further increase her propaganda. To continue with "Com~ 
mentator", who provides a good example of this later in 
1956, he wrote of the Ivliddle Eastern people: "In this 
.J 
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~ fight they seek sympathy, support and help-. They need 
'' 
sincere, reliable and true friends • 1136 It was natural 
that these peoples "should look more and more to the 
socialist countries" for this help. The Soviet Union is 
a "sincere and disinterested friend" for the Arabs, and so· 
on.· But this was just the surface appearance of a vigor-
ous Russian pol~cy which ultimately successfully portrayed 
the Soviet Union as the only one Great Power who "Ylas will-
ing to come to the aid of Egypt in time of crisis. The 
first important area of Soviet penetration was effected 
by the signing of an arms agreement between Czechoslovakia 
and Egypt on 27 September 1955 • 
~· 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ARMS DEAL 
Since 1949 the United States had been supplying a 
considerable amount of aid to Israel, both officia~ly 
and through unofficial Zionist organizations. If fact, 
often the security of Israel's budget depended upon the 
dollars which were flowing across the Atlantic to Israel. 
Between 1949 and 1955 the new country received some 3240 
million in grants and an additional 8143 million in cre-
dits.1 Although this aid was not specifically earmarked 
'.I!"' 
for the buying of arms, even if it had been definitely 
forbidden, the Israelis were able to divert resources 
from their regular budget into the buying of arms. Is-
rael, having emerged into a hostile world, felt she needed 
to be able to maintain herself without too much reliance 
on any of the Great Powers. It is true th9,t Arab nations 
were also being assisted by the United States, but not to 
the same extent. Nasser particularly felt this inequality 
of aid and consequently of strength. This was becoming 
painfully apparent in 1955, when Egyptian raids on Israel 
were being effectively both repulsed and replied to in 
kind. Nasser needed arms and needed them badly, if he 
was to maintain his leadership over the Arab world. 
What particularly annoyed Nasser was the Israeli 
attack on Gaza in 1955.2 To this he could not make a 
• 
meaningful reply without arms. Nasser was being influenced 
··· ··:·· .f·' '•' • ,~.',-. ."'i,. ..... ·1,r;'. , .... ~ , 
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"'-b Y pressures in the Arab area, where -J.e was regarded as 
the man who could lead the Arabs along the neutralist 
path, neither veering to East or West, in line with the 
Ti to-Nehru-Nasser triumvirate which had been established. 
April 1955 had seen the assembling of many of the Afro-
Asian neutral states and the :Bandung Conference. Here 
Nasser had come into contacdr~.:wi th many Communist and So-
cialist states.3 China, for example, offered to buy 
Egyptian cotton, and a trade agreement to this effect was 
signed in August of the same year. Between June and Nove 
ember 1955, Egypt signed economic agreements with China, 
Hungary, Poland, _East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. 
From the latter she bought 500,000 tons of crude oil in 
September 1955. 
Egypt was gradually associating herself with other 
than Western powers. The pressures of the Arab world, 
the attacks by and on Israel, as well as her growing par-
ticipation on the international socialist scene caused 
Nasser "to fling a gesture of defiance to the 'imperial-
ists• and of confidence to the Arab nationalists,"4 by 
eventually signing an agreement,to receive arms from 
Czechoslovakia. The Arabs at this time were "characters 
in search of a hero", 5 and in Nasser they had found one, 
especially when he attempted to strike out on an indepen-
dent course, independent, that is, of his forme.r ties 
to the West. 
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Under the 1954 agreement with Britain over the SU.ez 
J3a$.e, 1 t had been agree that Egypt would maintain this 
base, ready for reuse by the British if the need should 
occur. One authority claims that Nasser 00confidently 
expected as an earnest of the new spirit which was·tto 
animate Anglo-Egyptian relations" to receive arms from 
Britain in order that he might "cover his eastern flank".~ 
Theoretically the "eastern flank" is the Israeli border, 
although Nasser may have wanted arms for not purely de-
fensive purposes. He took the refusal of arms as "a 
breach of faith, and reacted strongly in his nature of 
soldier conspirator". If he could not get arms from the 
West, he would turn to the East. Nasser had had a cer-
tain amount of success at the Bandung Conference and had 
become acquainted with the ways of dealing with the Com-
munists. What better form of diplomatic defeat could 
' ·, 
there be for Britain and the United States than an arms 
deal between Egypt and the Communist bloc? If Nasser could 
accomplish it, this would raise his prestige among the 
Arabs as well as enable him to take a stronger line in 
the Israe1i dispute. 
This turning to the East, though, was not part of 
some long range plan or some preconceived strategy.7 It 
was part of the emptrical conduct of Nasser's diplomacy, 
a practical method of overcoming particular problems. 
This does not mean that those with whom he was dealing 
. .1 
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saw lu,s actions in this light. For the Soviet Union at 
least, it was a golden opportunity to gain influence in 
an area which had been a desire of Russian rulers since 
the time of Catherine the Great. 
Nasser had already attempted to get arms directly 
from the United States. When Dulles heard of Egypt's 
request through Henry A. Byroade, an Assistant Secretary 
and his Near Eastern Advisor, he replied that American 
arms could only be bought for dollars. In addition there 
would be strings. For example, it would be necessary 
that an office of United States military aid should be 
opened in Cairo to see how the arms were used.8 For Nas-
ser this was too much interference by a Great Power. He 
had and was in the process of nilding Egypt of one Great 
Power; he did not want to throw Egypt under the wing of 
' . 
another with all its implications. Should Nasser do 
that, his position in the Arab world would be consider-
ably jeopardized. There were to be "no strings for a 
hero 11 • 9 
But Dulles had been active on the problems of the 
Middle East. Between October 1954 and August 1955 the 
Arab-Israeli dispute received an exhaustive exa.mi nation 
, from all agencies of the United States government con-
cerned with foreign policy.lo After the study had been 
' eompleted, it was concluded that the matter was capable 
of settlement, but that this could not be done by active 
-· /. ~. '-,. ... 
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mediation on the part of a Great fower, because this 
could cause resentment on the Arab side. On 25 August 
1955 Dulles made a speech tG the Council on Foreign Re-
lations, in which he offeredi (1) A United States guaran-
tee of Arab-Israeli frontiers, if the states involved 
could come to some agreement on the frontier problem. 
(2) A mQnetary contribution to compensate Arab refugees, 
· who had lost their ho~es in Israel during the partition 
of Palestine in 1948.11 
But little was to come of Dulles• initiative. A 
United States guarantee of any kind was turned down in1 
principle by most of the Arab countries as a part of 
their continuing refusal to join the Baghdad Pact. Why 
they should acquiese in a guarantee supporting a state 
of affairs of which they did not approve, such as the 
boundaries• question (and therefore the territorial inte-
grity of Israel), is hard to see. One wonders if Dulles 
could really have been sincere in this proposal, given 
the basic premise that he wasn't being na!ve. The second 
proposal of monetary aid to re:f'ugees certainly would not 
be supported by the Arab states. One of their most po-
tent diplomatic bargaining pieces was, and today still is, 
the plight of the refugees, particularly in Jordan. No 
sane Arab would give up this important diplomatic card. 
Why Dulles thought they would is not clear, but the 
Egyptians soon were to declare their noncompliance with 
25 
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the American idea. Sho,rtly after this speech, rumours 
began to circulate of an arms deal having been affected 
between Egypt and an Iron Curtain country. On 27 Septem-
ber Nasser announced the signing of an agreement with 
Czechoslovakia exchanging arms for Egyptian cotton. This 
brought to a crisis the line of policy which the United 
States had been developing and upset the balance of power 
in the Middle East, which had been built up between Bri-
tain, France, and the United States since 1950.12 
In February of 1955 Molotov had spoken of the :f'riend-
ship;_which existed between Russia and Egypt, and he bol-
\ 
ster1d this statement up by promising to help Egypt in 
I 
her assertion of independence from Britain.13 During the 
following April while the Bandung Conference was in pro-
gress, Moscow issued a statement in which a wish for 
security in the Middle East was indicated as well as a 
sharp criticism of Western policy in the area. The Soviet 
Union called on the Middle Eastern nations to quit "ag-
gressive military blocs", a statement which was aimed 
particularly at the Eaghdad Pact. We have seen how, at 
the Bandung Conference, Egypt set in motion a long series 
of trade agreements with Communist bloc countries. In 
May of 1955 Russia offered to arrange the sale of arms to 
Egypt. The negotiations were being conducted by Daniel 
(} 
S. Solod, the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo. :But Nasser?:.'tr.anted 
arms fro~ the West, no doubt aware of the difficulties into 
26 
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which Egypt might stumble if she accepted the Russian 
offer. But as we have seen, Dulles overlaid an American 
arms deal with conditions, which Nasser would not accept. 
In addition, Nasser had told the United States that if 
Egypt could not get arms from the West, then she would 
turn to the Soviet Union. In August Shepilov visit·ed 
Cairo, and it was during this time that the United States 
offered $27 million worth of arms to Egypt under the con-
ditions already outlined. But the Soviet Union offered 
more arms on better terms, and an agreement was signed 
between Czechoslovakia and Egypt in September 1955. 
Russia had succeeded in gaining a significant foot-
hold in the Middle East. The price Egypt was to pay was 
~ ... t' 
in terms of cotton with a small amount of cash only. Of 
course for the Soviet Union the selling of arms had little 
or no economic stimulus, for it was predominantly a poli-
tical move. By this stroke Russia emerged as "a first 
rate power" in the Middle East •14 Dallin argues that the ... , 
West should have forseen this move and had overlooked the 
birth of a new "Axis" in the Middle East, as Russia was 
attempting to supplant British power which was being. 
withdrawn. To claim that the West "should have" forseen 
this development is to claim hindsight as a partner. Eut 
more than this, the United States knew that she could not 
make Egypt join the Baghdad Pact, yet she did not want to 
grant arms which might be turned against Israel and thus 
... 
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precipitate a crisis. What America did not know was that 
she could not keep Britain in line with her policy; and it 
was ultimately British policy which stimulated the out-
break of war in the Middle East. Certainly a good part 
of Israel's attack on Egypt in October 1956 was in the 
nature of a preventive war and had been created by fear 
of a newly armed Egypt, but as we shall see it is unlike-
ly that Israel would have ~Qved without the support of 
Britain. Also, Dallin's fear of an "Axis" is hard to 
understand in as much as whatever axis there was seemed 
very minimal in effect. Beyond arms and technical aid.~ 
Russia was not prepared to go. It is argued later in 
this paper that even in the crisis she had little real 
intention of landing Russian troops on Egyptian soil, if 
only for the good reason that she knew the United States 
would not acquiese to this. 
But Nasser also was not so naive as to let himself 
be washed away by a Communist undercurrent. The Commu-
nist bloc, just as much as the West, has found over the 
years that when dealing with new and ardent nationalism, 
the likelihood of creating satellites from the emerging 
nations is very small indeed, especially if the territory 
is not contiguous with one's own or with an area under 
one's control. Ilt fact the novel point about the arms 
deal was the way in which it enabled the Soviet Union to 
merely interfere in an area hitherto closed to her. To 
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expect more would have been most unrealistic, and "realist" 
is an epithet which is well applied to the Kremlin. 
But Dallin does show the way in which Russia's in-
fluence did increase apart from the actual arms deai, 15 
although this stood the Egyptians in little stead when 
the crisis broke out. In October 1955 Shepilov offered 
other terms of aid, and as the year closed Soviet and 
Czech technicians and specialists began to assemble in 
Egypt. At the same time Egyptian officiers were sent to 
train in Poland. By March 1956 Russian arms had found 
their way not only to Egypt, but also to Syria, where 
Russian activity increased. In April and June 1956 more 
Russian arms were delivered to Egypt. On the surface, 
although Nasser still maintained a wary eye on his newly 
found benefactor, Russia toned down some of the charges 
she had previously levelled at Nasser regarding the sup-
pression of Communists in Egypt. Support was also to be 
seen in Ru.ssian writings for Nasser's attempt to solve 
11. 
Egypt's economic problems.16 This attitude was to be 
manifested later in help for the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam. 
One Russian author wrote: "A wise Arab proverb sa;ya: 
'Find a companion before setting out, a neighbor before 
building a house. 1 " 17 For the Egyptians it was Russia 
who was the friend and neighbor. Besidesroffering friend-
" 
ship, the author continued, the Soviet Union offered much 
;, 
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needed commodities to Egypt. "In this way the weap~oncrJof 
'' 
blackmail and political extortion which they utilized in 
their own interests was struck from the hands of foreign ( 
monopolies."18 In September 1955 it was claimed that 
60,000 tons of Egyptian rice was exchanged for 500,000 
tons of Soviet. oil. This type of---,transaction demonstrated 
' 
the identity of interest between Egypt and Russia it was 
claimed. 
Most authorities on the question of the arms deal 
"' 
ascribe the Czech sale of arms to Egypt in September 1955 
as the first move of Communist arms into the Middle Eastern 
area. According to one writer this is not so, for the sale 
of arms to Egypt had been preceeded by a sale of arms to 
Syria.19 In the first half of 1954, "according to French 
Intelligence," about thirty German Mark IV tanks, that had 
been reconditioned at the Skoda Works, were shipped to 
Syria. A recent election in Syria had swung in a leftist 
direction and the Soviet Union had taken advantage of the 
situation. But Turkey and Iraq were interested in forcing 
Syria into the Baghdad Pact. On about 20 March 1955 Tur-
key moved some of her military armour and heavy artillery 
onto the Syrian border, ostensibly "to prevent smuggling". 
'. 
Nuri-es Said did the same tn the south. Damascus became 
seriously alarmed at this move by Turkey and Iraq and 
applied to the Soviet Union for help. She was given a 
. ~arantee by Rtlasia. On 23 and 31 March the Syrian 
~ 
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Minister in Moscow was told that not one soldier would 
cross the frontier, and on 31 March the Soviet Minister 
to Damascus visited Premier Sabri Assali and repeated the 
Soviet guarantee. Humbaraci claims that this guarantee 
made a very strong impression on the Arab countries, so 
much so that: 
When the Al Kahira (a Cairo daily newspaper.} ex-
tended its§ invitation to Moscow to intervene in 
lrab affairs 9 it recalled 00 how Ru.ssia reassured 
the Arabs when Turkish troops 8oncentrated re-
cently on the Syri~ border" .2 
If this sequence of events is correctly interpreted, 
it would seem that the Egyptian arms deal was only a 
follow-up of what had already occured in Syria. But 
whichever country received arms first, the fact remains 
that the bal·ince of power in the Middle East had changed. 
Certainly the quantity and quality of arms given to Egypt 
(which included Ilyshin 28 jet bombers, MIG fighters, 
' 
Joseph Stalin Mark III tanks, Clzech T34 tanks and other 
. . 
heavy equipment) was far greater than those given to 
Syria, and therefore of prime importance. 
Charles D. Kenney has characterized the manner in 
which the Soviets "precipitately tipped the scales of 
power in the ultra-sensitive Middle Eastn.~~ They did 
this by gaining access to t1t,e Mediterranean _littoral, 
injecting Ru.ssian influence into the Arab area at the 
same time that British power was declining, by sharpening 
the tensions between Arabs and Israel,is, by encou!aging 
31 
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Nasser :to press anti-Western policies which "culminated" 
in the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and then 
by supporting him in his bid for complete control of the· 
canal. The arms deal was a form of "vicarious military 
pressure1123 in an area where the $oviets had hitherto 
no presence. 
But why was Russia willing to start an arms race in 
the Arab world, knowing how unstable the area was? Cer-
tainly she was gaining her long range objective of seeing 
the decline of British influence without much cost to 
herself'. Also she knew of the dangers inherent in any 
local conflict and the chance of such a conflict escalat-
ing and thereby causing America on the one side and her-
self on the other to be drawn in. Yet, as we shall see, 
she was able to avoid the full consequences of such a 
confrontation by agitating on the outskirts of the con-
flict which developed, rather than associating herself in 
',) 
active participation. 
Walter z. Laqueur has argued that the poliei of the 
West in the last resort was to keep peace in the Middle 
East if possible. "By arming Egypt and Syria, Russia 
made an Arab •second round' against Israel a distinct 
possibility, if not a probability ••• 1124 Should a war of 
this nature break out, he argued, Russia and Communism 
would be the benefactors of such a clash, whatever result 
might occur. If the Arabs won the contest, the Soviet 
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Union would reap the gratitude of the victors for having 
helped'.,~ with Russian arms. If on the other hand the Arabs 
had lost, "popular democracies" would have emerged. Cer-
tainly one can agree with the former prophecy, but with 
the latter there appears to be some doubt. It is worth 
noting that one of Eden's aims was to topple Nasser, and 
he does not seem to have envisaged the emergence of a 
pro-Russian Egyptian government in Nasser's place! On 
the contrary, the premise suggested that he expected a 
pro-Western, preferably pro-British, government to emerge, 
as the Egyptians by then would have seen the folly of 
Nasser's association with the Oomn~nist world. Such a 
government would align itself along with Britain in the 
Eaghdad Pact. Nor is there any outstanding reason why the 
collapse of Nasser, had it occured, should bring other 
than this result, especially if British and French troops 
had taken over Egypt as was their original scheme. In 
addition, Nasser had effectively disposed of pro-Communist 
Egyptians, as we have seen, although there might have been 
the possibility of their re-emergence should he have been 
overthrown without the intervention of Wester~ power. 
The Russians appear to have been well aware of the 
dangers of their act however. Again Laqueur notes that in 
a Soviet statement of April 1956 there was a slight step-
,!11 
back from the implications of the arms deal, when "a 
peaceful and just settlement" was proposed for the 
33 
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Arab-Ifraeli conflict. 25 This was regarded as a mild 
set-back for the Arabs who expected, Laquer claims~ un-
qualified support from Moscow. The Kremlin was well 
aware of the dangers of escalation and "American and 
British intervention would create an awkward dilemma, 
to say the least." 26 Through the arms deal Russia had 
gained her objective of a foothold in the Middle East 
but was reluctant to push further. There was little 
evidence that she wanted to engage in "military ventures" 
which might have had incalculable consequences. In fact 
her actions in November 1956 showed that she had no desire 
to take a more positive role in the Arab world than she 
had by that time. 
In late September 1955 when the annual meeting of 
the United Nations General Assembly had drawn many of 
the world's leading foreign ministers to New York, Dulles 
gave a dinner in the Waldorf-Astoria. 27 Present were 
Dulles, Macmillan, Pinay and Molotov. Each of them had 
been at the "s1Jmmi t" conference at which the (elusive) 
"spirit of Geneva" had been created. It was on the oc-
casion of this dinner that the three Western ministers 
took the opportunity to protest to Molotov over the re-
cently announced Egyptian arms deal. Molotov was told of 
Western efforts to maintain peace in the area by keeping 
some form of "arms balance" between Israel and Egypt. 
(How much of a balance there was is diffipult to tell, 
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but it seems certainly to have been in favour of the 
West's protege, Israel.) Molotov claimed that the deal 
with Czechoslovakia was nothing more than a "commercial 
transaction1128 to which Macmillan countered saying that 
the West could not view it in this light. Pinay said 
that such a move as this was contrary to the "Geneva spi-
rit", especially as the danger of war in the area was all 
the more increased. The three Western representatives 
believed they impressed Molotov with their arguments, and 
although he never retreated from claiming it was a ''coromeP-
cial transaction", "he did promise to pass their views 
along to his government. n 29 
The Western powers in fact did treat the arms deal 
with grave concern, especially the United States, whose 
task it was gradually becoming to keep the Russians out of 
the Middle East. In an article in The New Republic of 5 
December 1955, it was reported that Dulles had used strong 
words regarding the significance of the arms deal.30 In 
briefing the National Security Council and the Cabinet, 
the Secretary of States is reported to have said: 
The Soviet Arms Deal with Egypt has created a 
crisis for the free world as great as the Com-
m1nist invasion of South Korea in 19500 In 
fact 9 if the Russians should consolidate a 
position of strength in Egypt, the results 
would be more disas1trous than the Communist seizure of Chinao3 
If this report is accurate, it demonstrates clearly 
how seriously.Dulles viewed the Russian move into the 
-35 
area. Considering a predominantly American interest in 
the Far East., it is surprising that he put the loss of 
- China to the Communists in 1948 as of less import than 
would be a strong Russian position in Egypt. Why this 
should be is not clear. Certainly American interests, in 
oil particularly, had been growing in areas like Saudi 
Arabia. Also, as we have seen, the Northern Tier system 
of alliances was important to the whole policy of contain-
ment, which Dulles partly formulated and vigorously ad-
hered to. The Russian act of "hedgehopping" had obviously 
caught the West off their guard and had struck a blow not 
only strategically but also through the element of pres-
tige. 
The outcome of the deal then was serious for the 
United States. Another v1ri ter in The New Republic por-
.. / trayed Soviet policy in this way • 32 Russia, as the Uni teer·,.. 
States policy makers saw it, he said, wanted to isolate 
the Arab states from the "free" world. She would do this 
by whipping up an Israeli crisis, a "brink of war si tua-
tion" in which Soviet arms and loans, advisors and techni-
cians would take the Arab side. In the United Nations, 
Soviet votes and vetoes would play their part in creating 
tensions. Nasser would build Arab unity around ultra-
nationalist, anti-Israeli elements in the six Arab states. 
In addition it is possible that the United States might 
cooperate by rushing arms to Israel and withdrawing aid 
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from the Arabs. But·the latter point is the misleading 
one. If anyone was to .exacerbate the situation by comply-
ing with an arms: race in the area, it was not to be the 
United States. Rather, as we shall see, ]'ranee was to 
grant significant aid to Israel. 
Israel did in fact apply for American aid to offset 
! 
the Egyptian build-up, but the State Department would not 
view Israel's request favourably.33 There was domestic 
pressure for the United States government to grant the 
Israeli request for $65 million worth of aid, but she was 
no1 to be led into an arms race. Noomatter how much aid 
the United States gave the 1.8 million Israelis, the So-
viets had enough obsolete arms to supply the 40 million 
Arabs adequately. Also, the United States had no wish to 
leave her position on the fence and take definite sides 
in the ticklish dispute officially. In the long run it 
is possible that Dulles did the correct thing here. Al-
though Egypt was being armed by the Soviet Union, the su-
periority of Israeli arms and army was amply demonstrated 
in the Suez war. Certainly the Egyptians had not bee~ 
fully able to utilize all their arms, especially their 
air force. In addition, as soon as the attack started, 
the Soviet Union had her I:l-28 jets flown back to Russia 
by way of the Sudan and Prague. So it was not the amount 
of aid which·. Egypt had which was eventually important, 
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but the limitations on its use, although the Western 
powers were not to know that at the time of the agreement. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ASWAN DAM AND THE NATIONALIZATION 
OF THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY 
When considering the series of incidents leading up 
to the United States' withdrawal of her offer to aid in 
the building of the Aswan High Dam on 14 July 1956 and 
N~sser's subseq~ent nationalization of the SUez Canal 
Company on 26 July 1956, the observer is struck by the 
part which the personalities of Dulles and Nasser played 
in this aspect of the crisis. It seems to be a ·mistake 
to claim that the actions of each of these persons were 
the result of long-term deliberation, the result of well-
considered policies with blueprints having been circulated 
and advice sought for months before. This does not deny 
that both Nasser and Dulles had not previously considered 
the implications of their actions, but merely suggests 
that the final decision, particularly that of Dulles, was 
taken in the heat of the moment. The folly of such 
methods becomes obvious, for it appears from this time on 
as if some inexorable minister moved the complicated re-
actions of various states towards the crisis of November 
1956 in the Middle East. 
The Aswan High Dam project was not an innovation 
created by Nasser's government. If ~act the idea had 
long been tossed about in Egyptian and British government 
circles. John Marlowe has described the project as "the 
. ' . . .. - . ~:.; .-·' .. · ... ,: ' ,, \ . '• 
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magnum opus which every Egyptian government, in its more 
optimistic moments, had dreamed of composing. It was al-
most inevitable that the military regime should have 
taken it up. "l The ttam was not a new idea, but Nasser 
was able to take this issue and expand it until it appeared 
that the dam and only the dam would be\ the force by which 
Egypt could progress, if she was to be able to feed, 
clothe, and educate her rapidly expanding polulation. 
Nass~r took the idea and fro~ what had been a question 
" 
I 
for Egyptian nationals together with discussion on the 
project with other countries, the dam became an issue 
for Egyptian nationalists around which the growth of 
!) 
chauvinism could find_ a ready soil to feed upon. It was 
through this nationalistic medium that Nasser was able to 
take over the Suez Canal Company with his rabble rousing 
oration of 26 July. 
The proposed dam was to be very large, soma 250 feet 
high in the centre and three miles wide. 2 The lake to be 
formed by the dam would be 300 miles long. It would en-
able Egypt to increase the land under irrigation by one-
third and allow her to increase her electric power resources 
by eight times her capacity in 1956. Not only would the 
project help in developing her agriculture, but it also 
would give a great boost to the Egyptian industrial ma-
chine. 
The suggestion had been first broached by English 
-·-·-----·--"- ---,--•-.,-· .. ,-:o-,· 'J. -..• ,,,,r 
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engineers in the 1880's and was brought to light periodi-
cally, being eventually ~the Egyptian revolutionists• 
most beloved symbol of the Egypt of their heart's de-
sires ... 3 To Nass er the dam would be his crovvn:ing achieve-
ment, if he could bring about the construction of the 
project and thus assure for himself the everlasting 
gratitude of his countrymen. To this end Nasser adopted 
the slogan: "Sevente-en Times Larger than the Greatest 
Pyramid! 11 , 4 and he set himself to achieve this aim. Very 
little previously had been done about the dam, aside from 
plans, "an omission which could conveniently be laid at 
the door of British Imperialism. 115 Had Britain fostered 
scheme earlier, the whole course of events in the 
~·Middle East would probably have been altered. But to 
suppose such as this is to ignore the basis of imperial-
• ism. 
The proj~ct had the complete sympathy of the Western 
powers from the beginning, that is as long as it remained 
purely a question of economics. Once it entered the 
field of political bargaining and became enmes~ed in the 
question of the arms deal and of the cold war in general, 
the complications towards realization of the scheme be-
came immense. Had Nasser not attempted to confuse the 
issue in this way, he might well have had his dam far 
sooner and with less difficulty than it finally caused 
him. 
- _,._, ___ -, .. , .. , ........ -.' -· - . •,-,.·~---- ........... _ ....... ~-·· ...... _. 
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The idea of a loan for the project was first brought 
to light on 16 December 1955, when the United States and 
Britain offered Egypt a loan with which to commence work. 
S56 million was to be contributed by the United States, 
' 
while Britain's share was $14'. million. In addition the 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (The 
World Bank) offered some $200 million towards the project. 
Mr. Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank, was 
particularly enthusiastic about the dam, and he and his 
associates had conducted careful investigations into the 
Egyptian economy and the financing of the idea. The free 
grants of $70 million by Britain and the United States 
were to cover the first stage of construction. The $200 
million loan from the World Bank for the second stage was 
to be increased by a $130 million loan from the United 
States and an 880 million loan from Britain. The remain-
ing $760 million was to furnished by Egypt in the way of 
· manpower, materials, and currency. The s1Jms involved were 
huge for a state like Egypt, but not of such magnitude for 
the United States. The whole scheme was to take between 
"' fourteen ,and ,eighteen years to complete. 
There were several conditions attached to the loans 
however. Firstly, all contracts were to be on a competi-
tive basis. This meant in practice that most of the large 
contractors would be either American or European, and the 
immediate profits accruing from this would not flow into 
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the Egyptian economy. Secondly, Egypt's internal economy 
must be managed so as to avoid inflation; and thirdly, the 
World Bank would "review" the Egyptian economy "and pro-
/ pose to Egypt how she should adjust her total expenditures 
to her financial resource·s. ••7 No doubt these conditions 
are reasonable to a Western capitalist mind intent upon 
making the matter a paying proposition. The conditions 
have all the economic and psychological overtones of the 
scrupulous entrepreneur in a free-working capitalist eco-
nomy. All this was very sound, as far as it went, but the 
main problem was that the recipients of the aid and loans 
did not view the conditions from the vantage point of 
Western entrepreneurs. Finer complains that "It was not 
possible to get into Nasser's head the understanding that 
the loan was economic rather than political, and that the 
conditions also fell into the former category. "8" But 
herein lies a blatant case of lack of empathy. Surely to 
the mind of a nationalist revolutionary, who had effective-
ly taken part in and indeed led his country to see the 
end of quasi-colonial control, economics and politics are 
inextricably intertwined. To a mind nurtured on probably. 
Lenin or Hobson, economic control was one of the bases of 
imperialism. Many of the newer nations smarting under 
such contro]s only a few years after independence have 
. dubbed these practices, whether rightly or wrongly, as 
\. 
"neo-colonialist". To such a mind it is not surprising 
·q 
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that the "innocent" controls to be put on the debtor·by 
the creditors seemed to be a quasi-political control over 
a sovereign state by outsiders. Nasser certainly claimed· 
this in his speech of 26 July. Only in a highly developed 
country, indeed it could be claimed only in a welfare 
state system operating in a condition of affluence, does 
economics become to all intents and purposes divorced 
from Joli tries. _ 
It might be noted in the light of later developments 
that the offer of aid and loans from the Weste~ powers 
came a~er the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms agreement of 
September 1955. One of the reasons for America's with-
drawal of the offer in July 1956 was that Egypt's cotton· 
crop was mortgaged for some years ahead for repayment of 
the arms. But no mention of this appears in the discus~~ 
sions of the Western powers in December 1955. Eden does 
concern himself with this aspect in his memoirs however.9 
Yet even here he infers that the West· only realized this 
"as the months passed". Although no firm evidence can be 
found to the contrary, it does seem unlikely that when the 
arms deal was first heard of in the West, the question of 
payment was not raised. I~ this was the case then the 
parties who offered Egypt the loans in late 1955 were 
~~·~ 
seriously amiss in their homework on the matter. If, on 
the other hand, this point had been realized, then to 
bring it up later as a reason for withdrawing the loan 
44 
demonstrates its use simply as a loophole or an excuse;. 
Nasser obviously believed on his part that the nego-
tiations for the loan were part of the political game. 
He demonstrated this in his behaviour over several mat-
ters. Firstly, about six months elapsed between the time 
of the offer and its acceptance by Egypt in July 1956. 
Secondly, Nasser was intent upon attempting the game of 
playing off the East against the West. This can be seen 1 
in two moves he made. 
The first was the signing of an agreement on econo-
mic and technical cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet 
Union on 29 January 1956.10 This agreement provided for 
technical aid to Egypt in the form of geological explora-
tion, selection and advise on construction sights, col-
lecting of data and establishment of industrial enterprises, 
and the training of Egyptian personnel in Russia for tech-
nical employment. Also, the Soviet Union extended credit 
of 700 rubles with interest accruing at 1/2% per annum. 
This credit was for the purchase and maintenance of such 
materials as necessary in the Soviet Union and for payment 
of training expenses of skilled personnel. If any doubt 
was to be thrown on Egypt's ability to repay the Western 
loans, it might be here that doubts might arise. In the 
agreement, any excess cost about the 700 million rubles 
credit was·to be paid in terms of Egyptian goods to the 
Soviet Union. 
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The second aspect of Nasser's attempt to decrease 
Western demands and conditions lay in a direct blow at 
one of America's most sensitive points. On 15 May 1956 
Egypt recognized Communist China. For some years such a 
move as this has been a diplomatic manner of giving vent 
to criticism of the United States. France has recently 
done this in her latest bid to assert her independence 
of American control within NATO. Likewise, in all proba-
bility Nasser's action was for a similar motive. He knew 
this would not be viewed with approval by the United 
States government, and indeed the matter did create some 
difficulty when appropriations for the loan were being 
discussed in Congress. As if to back up Nasser's inde-
pendence of the United States, the Egyptian government 
did not inform the State Department directly, but allowed 
the news of this action to be passed to the United States 
Ambassador 1·n Cairo, Henry Byroade, by the Nationalist 
Chinese Minister! 1111 
These various actions demonstrated clearly that 
Nasser was not willing to become the economic slave of 
the Western powers. He had driven the Eritish out of 
Egypt, avoided entanglement in .. the Baghdad Pact, signed 
an arms deal with a Commu.nist,state, dealt a heafty blow 
~ 
to the United States' pre·stige by recognizing Red China, 
and finally was becoming increasingly interested in trade 
r 
with the Soviet bloc. None of this was to endear the 
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Egyptian Premier to American or British hearts; most of 
1 t helped to increase Nasser' 1s prestige both as a neutral-
ist and independent leader of the Arab world. 
In the period from 1953 to 1956, Egypt's percentage 
of total trade with the Soviet bloc12 on the export side 
increased from 12.2% to 34.4%, while on the import side 
it increased from 7.7% to 14.4%.13 This demonstrated 
that the "Soviet economic offensive" was annually growing 
to some effect. One of the reasons for this upsurge, on 
the political front, was that the policy of the Soviet 
Union was to identify herself with the national develop-
ment of some of the newer nations.14 Since it is a 
Marxian tenet that economic acts always have political 
implications, the Soviet Union was at pains to play down, 
the political nature of these moves. We saw this in the 
Russians' description· of the arms deal as a purely "com--
mercial transaction", and we see it in this general 
growth. Nevertheless it might be argued that the general 
aim of Russia was to wean the developing countries away 
from the West, if not to enmesh them in Soviet folds then 
certainly to encourage a kind of benevolent neutrality 
in the cold war, but if possible to make them somewhat 
more economically dependant upon Russia than they had 
been hitherto.15 
In spite of this whole series of associations with 
Jl 
the opposite bloc, nevertheless the United States seemed 
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d ) . 1 . still willing to go ahea with her pans for aid to Egypt 
for the Aswan Dam. Then rumours began to circulate that 
on top of the Soviet economic agreement of January 1956 
the Soviet Union had told Egypt that she would be willing 
to grant aid to Egypt for the dam project on~ better terms 
than those given by the United States, Britain, and the 
World Bank. Wherefrom these rumours originated is hard 
to decide, but whether they were true or false, the Soviet 
Union did little to discourage the idea; and some years 
after the Suez Crisis she did begin to aid Egypt in the 
construction of the dam.16 Finer attributes Nasser's re-
luctance to finally accept the West's offer to the exis-
tence of a Russian counter-offer, which he dates as two 
months a~er the West's approach to Egypt, that would be 
late February 1956.17 He writes: "The most fantastic 
stories of Russian assistance became the fervent goss~' 
of the Cairo and Alexandrian bazaars." Rondot acknow-
ledges that "the u.s.s.R. let it be known it was ready to 
provide aid on more favourable and libera,l terms", but he 
ascribes no source to the rumour.18 Another observer 
suggests that it was Nasser who "hinted" that "Russia had 
made him an offer of a loan of 300 billion dollars for 
the ·project with no strings attached • 1119 Whatever the 
source of the rum.our and whether or not an offer had been 
made ia not tll~·.:illlp:01:tant point however. The fact is 
that this rumour weighed very heavily in Dulles• mind 
48 
when he shaped his refusal to continue the offer of aid. 
The plausibility of the rumour became more likely 
when on 15 June 1956 Dimitri Shepilov, the Foreign Minis-
ter of the Soviet Union, arrived in carro.20 Nasser and 
Shepilov with their advisers entered into secret negotia-
tions with "off-the-record" news being put abroad that 
the Soviet Union had offered to lend Egypt the total cost 
of the dam with a low interest rate and on extensive re-
payment period. Shepilov joined Nasser in Port Said to 
celebrate the departure of the last British soldier. 
During Nasser's speech it was noted that he turned to 
Shepilov as he said, "Our policy is frank. We shall co-
operate with anybody or any country ready to cooperate 
with us." 
Ultimately Dulles• position depended on Eisenhower, 
and the President tended to be heavily against the United 
States being blackmailed over the matter of foreign aid. 
Indeed Eisenhower had made several public pronouncements 
to this effect. 21 No doubt Dulles agreed with Eisenhower 
anyway, but should he not, his policy would have changed 
but little, it may be argued. 
In mid-July Nasser met with Tito and Nehru on the 
island of Brioni. This was the highest peak of recogni-
tion of Nasser's increasing importance as a neutralist 
that he had received since the Bandung Conference in 1955. 
At Brioni Nasser was meeting, apparently on equal terms, 0 
49 · 
Witli the two leading neutralist )powers of the world. It 
was at this crucial moment that Dulles chose to announce 
the withdrawal of the loan. In some ways his awkward 
timing of the announcement is not altogether to be laid 
at his door. Just before the Brioni conference Nasser 
had instructed Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egy~tian Ambassador to 
Washington, to return to the United States and accept the 
offer of the loan. There had been reports circulating 
that the United States was reluctant to follow through on 
its December offer because of Nasser's attitude. Hussein 
was urging Nasser to accept while the offer still existed, 
having observed a growing opposition to the loan in the 
United States. Although the American budget for 1956-57, 
anounced on 4 July, included appropriations for the Aswan 
High Dam, Dulles told a press conference some six days 
later that it was "improbable" that Egypt would get the 
loan. 22 On, 18 July Dulles told Sir Roger Makim, the Bri-
tish Ambassador to the -United States, that he was "dubious" 
about making the loan. Makim later urged the Secretary 
of State to couch the refusal in very careful terms and 
indeed if possible to stall for some time. 
When the final refusal came the British government 
was notified of the move rather than consulted. Eden's 
...... 
government had come to the conclusion by mid-July that 
they could no longer continue the original offer 9 but 
they did not counsel a dramatic withdrawal announcement. 
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Eden writes, "I would have preferred to play this long 
and not to have forced the issue. There was no need to 
hurry. Unhappily things did not work out that way. 1123 
Su.ch an abrupt announc·ement as occured on the part 
of Dulles seems to have wounded both Nasser's pride at 
Brioni and Eden's in London. Cursory movements of this 
nature are not always wise in politics, especially if one 
is involved in an alliance structure. Dulles' argument 
was that it was necessary to demonstrate to the world 
that a small power could not blackmail the United States 
into acquiescence the way Egypt had attempted to do. As 
such, a curt, stern statement was needed to reprimand the 
wayward child. As Beal has written, the refusal "had to 
be forthright, carrying its own built-in moral for neutrals 
in a way that the ormolu of applied propaganda would not 
cheapen11 • 27 It was the action of a man who believed he 
knew he was right! In effect, Dulles' action precipitated 
a crisis, the course of which he did not forsee, and it 
also caused yet another strain in Anglo-American· relations 
in the Middle East. 
There seems little doubt but that Nasser's reply to 
Dulles' action a week later was to nationalize the Suez 
Canal Company •. The concession which the Egyptian govern-
ment had granted the Suez Canal Company was to come up 
for revision in; 1968, and it can be argued that Nasser 
should have waited until that time in order to revoke the 
r· 
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Company's privileges. But again this fails to take ac-
count of the revolutionary mind, which in Nasser's case 
was atinnilated to act dramatically in the heat of the mo-
ment. But after the nationalization and the brave showing 
both leader and people were to make on 26 July, the Egypti-
ans were at considerable pains right up to November to 
maintain the canal and openly declare their intentions of 
complying to the "free passage" clause of the 1888 Conven-
tion.25 Yet the apparent haste does not rule out the 
possibility that this action had not been considered be-
fore. Contingency pl1anning goes on, at all levels in the 
government of a state. It is perfectly feasible that a 
system of blueprints had been drawn up to be implemented 
if the political situation warrented the action. In this 
case, Dulles' action precipitated that very political con-
dition under which an implementation of the plan would be 
deemed advisable. 
The occasion of Nasser's nationalization speech in 
Alexandria on 26 July 1956 was one of national importance, 
being the fifth anniversary of the revolution which over-
threw the Farouk government. 26 A nationalist setting 
such as this was ideal for making the announcement Nasser 
had among his papers. In speaking he stressed the aim of 
the government was to establish and maintain "a really 
independent state". Imperialism would not overthrow this 
,,. 
aim nor would it jeopardize "Arabdom" •- Nasser evoked 
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nationalist sentiment by mentioning two Egyptian patriots 
recently killed in fighting Israel, and he claimed that 
0-
they had died for Egypt's sake.. He placed Egypt, whose 
ttweight •• • has become greater on the international level, .. 27 
with the top ranking neutralist states and spoke of the~ 
recent Brioni Conference, where he had met with Nehru and 
Tito. 
Nasser then outlined the process of negotiation for 
the loan for the Aswan Dam, having given a brief survey 
, ,, 
of the way in which the government was attempting to in-
crease the wealth and standard of living of Egypt. (Be-
tween 1952 and 1956, he claimed, Egypt's national income 
increased by 16~.) But Egypt had enemies such as the 
United States and Britain, who had been trying to get her 
to enter an alliance for which Egypt had no desire. Nas~ 
ser decried the Baghdad Pact, lauded the absenc'e of Bri-
tish troops from the Canal Zone, and warned of the dangers 
of the imperialist hand upon Egypt's shoulder. He stressed 
that Egypt had boµ.ght arms "from Russia" and not "from 
) a(· 
Czechslovakia", 2 which were needed to defend Egypt 
against the Zionists. 
4> Nasser claimed that the dam had been in ·the govern-
ment's mind since 1952, and Egypt had approached the World 
Bank in 1953, which stalled in answering the request for 
the loan stressing that a political settlement should be 
made with Israel and Britain before the matter could go 
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further. Then the United States and Britain had offered 
aid in Decembe1~ 1955, and the World Bank followed suit, / 
but with conditions attached (which we have already seen 
were unacceptable to Egypt).. Nasser said, "Those stipu-
lations are inconsistant with our sovereignty, our prin-
ciples, and our independence. n 29 He told of the of:fer 
from the Soviet Union, although because Egypt was nego-
tiating with the World Bank, discussions with Russia 
should be put off. But the Western negotiations were to 
no avail, he told the audience. At each step the l~an 
.. 
would have to be renegotiated, so that if the West wanted 
to exert pressure upon Nasser and Egypt, it could with-
draw aid while the work on the dam was incomplete. Ne-
vertheless he eventually decided to accept the aid, Nasser 
said, because Egypt was being accused of rejecting the 
offer for political reasons, especially over matters of 
good relations with Britain and the Sudan. He recited 
how Ambassador Hussei~ in Washington was notified by 
Dulles of the withdrawal of the offer. Nasser spoke 
furiously against Dulles' implication, that the Egyptian 
economy was wea~; and in reply Nasser quoted figures and 
statistics from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook 
showing an increase in. national income. 
/'"'~ 
Nasser went on to say how he viewed Eugene Black, 
Chairman of the World Bank, as a kind of latter day 
Ferdinand de Lesseps (builder of the Suez Canal). Here 
. , _ 
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was the personffication of imperial control. The Suez 
Canal had been dug, Nasser claimed, with the loss of 
120,000 Egyptian lives. "And, although the Canal was dug 
for Egypt, as de Lesseps told the Khedive, Egypt had be-
come the prope~y of the Cana1.n30 Not only had the 
Egyptians lost some of their people in building the canal, 
but the Suez Canal Company was also milking the profits 
which, he inferred, should be flowing to Egypt. Nasser 
then; announced that the Canal was the property of Egypt 
and the revenues hitherto going to the Canal Company 
would now be channelled through the government in order 
to furnish the cos:t: of the dam: "The one hundred million 
dollars which are obtained annually from the Canal will 
be taken by us in the interest of Egypt ... 3l Nasser then-_ 
read out the law "in, the name of the nation", which na-
tionalized the Suez Canal Company.3 2 
Thus Nasser had taken the step by which within two 
months time his country was to be attacked by Britain·, 
France, and Israel. The Canal Company was dissolved and 
taken over by the Egyptian government. And much to the 
surprise particularly of the British and French, the 
Egyptian government kept the canal in working order and 
the traffic moving with the help of Russian pilots. The 
cause of the eventual blockage of the canal was to be a 
deliberate sinking of blockships by Nasser,,as a result 
of the allied attack on Egypt. 
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Nasser's speech demonstrates above all the attitude 
he had towards the withdrawal of the loan offered by the 
United States. The loan was nothing more or less than a 
political gambit in Nas~er•s mind, as were his attempts 
to play off each side in the cold war. But to·say that 
the Canal Company was nationalized as a reaction"· against 
withdrawal of the loan offer is not the same as saying 
that Nasser acted in a rash fit of "pique". No matter 
how patriotic and indignant a speech he made, N·a.sser• s 
timing and conduct of these matters suggests that he was 
well advised on the scheme of developments. In contrast, 
it is Dulles who seemed to be acting more from revenge 
than in the interests of his state, while it is unlikely 
that even so dramatic an act as Nasser's would seriously 
support the levelling of similar charges against Egypt~an 
interests. 
• 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ATTEMPTS AT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 
OF THE DISPUTE~ AND FAILURE 
By training Dulles was a commercial lawyer, who had 
for many years prior to his becoming Secretary of State 
seen much success in business on Wall Street. During the 
time between the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company 
and the Israeli attack on Egypt, Dulles took part in and 
contrived a number of conferences which were to lead to 
no settlement of the basic dispute. Although he was not 
eventually successful in avoiding the use of force, it 
does seem as if his lawyer's mind was creating a mesh of 
legal webs in which the disputants, particularly Britain 
and France, would become involved. Thus between the be-
ginning of August and the end of October 1956 American 
policy seems to have been directed at creating conditions 
to head off the use of force against Egypt, through legal 
entanglements of her allies. The very fact that it was 
Israel, and not Britain and France, who attacked Egypt in 
the first instance does credit Dulles' tactics with some 
success however. 
But the United States was not the only power to seek 
legal or quasi-legal means to attain her ends. From the 
very beginning of the dispute, Eden's government had been 
at pains to keep the dispute out of the United Nations. 
And just before Eden announced that the government had 
\ 
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decided at last to resort to the help of the United Na-
tions he justified the earlier reticence. In a speech in 
the House of Commons on 13 September 1956, he said: 
We have been following the course enjoined by Article 33 of the [United Nations] Charter to 
seek, first of all 9 a solution 9 80 by negotiation, 
enquiry 9 mediation 9 conciliation o o o Go Our ef-forts have not succeeded and we have taken the further stepoooOf informing the President of 
the Security Council of the situation which has arisenol 
Knowing the likelihood of a Soviet veto and knowing that 
should the matter go before the General Assembly, the 
mood would be against her, Britain could not possibly 
have hoped for a satisfactory settlement through the 
United Nations. Why then did she go there? 
Britain's normal attitude would have been to urge on 
a process of "quiet diplomacy", a behind-the-scene series 
of negotiations which traditionally was her method of re-
solving disputes. Yet rather than shupning the bright 
lights of the United Nations debate, Eden submitted the 
dispute to the Security Council. The probably reason is 
th~t by early September the British government had decided 
to use force against Nasser. To be in a position to do 
this, it was necessary to have behind Britain a record of 
attempts to settle the matter in some more peaceable man-
ner. Bringing the dispute to the United Nations would 
have provided this necessary aura, together with the two 
London Conferences of August and September. It would 
.. 
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create a quasi~legal and moral background against which 
Britain could pose as the "correct" sovereign state only 
yeilding to force to obtain her ends, when all other me-
thods of peaceful settlement had apparently been exhausted. 
But in spite of this strategy, it very nearly failed to 
succeed for, if Israel had not attacked Egypt on 29 Octo-
ber, a "casusbelli" might othervvise have been difficult 
to conjure up. 
However the policy of the United States was not only 
a stalling process, a cooling off period which might be 
induced; it was also based upon more stable foundations. 
Its basic purpose was to assert and support the idea that 
transit through the canal was a matter of right to the 
users, not a matter which depended entirely upon the suf-
ferance of Egypt. 2 This was Dulles' basic theme, seeing 
the issue as he did through a lawyer's eyes. This was 
the basis of his stimulus at the London Conferences, par-
ticularly with regard to the Suez Canal Users• Associa-
tion. As Beal suggests, to a legal mind like Dulles', it 
seemed that the users of the canal had an equivalent of. 
"easement" on the waterway, that is, " ••• a legal right 
that they could band together to protect and exercise 
against the man who threatened to ''oepri ve them of its 
use."3 
When the s-G'ez Canal Company was nationalized, Dulles 
was in Peru. representing the President at a Peruvian 
.. ,.,, .. , 
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state function. Eisenhower sent Robert Murphy to London 
in order that he could "hold the fort" until Dulles got 
there. Murphy's subsequent views on Eden and British po-
licy are interesting in light of what eventually happened. 
He .reports that Eden had no thought of asking the United 
States for anything, except he is reputed to have said; 
" ••• we do hope you will take care of the Bear. 114 It ap-
" 
pears that Murphy understood Eden to be "labouring under 
the impression that a common identity of interest existed 
among the allies."5 Murphy says that he did not believe 
this to be the American view, and he gave no encouragement 
to the idea. 
Of Dulles' policy Murphy reports that the Secretary 
of State c·ame to London accompanied by Herman Phleger, 
"the shrewd legal adviser of the State Department". The 
two lawyers had devise'd a series of delaying tactic, he 
reports, which were designed to support the p.blicy of 
avoiding military action. "It was philosophically assumed 
that the dangers of bellicose action would disappear if 
negotiationc were prolonged •• , 116 and as we have suggested, 
this policy was very nearly successful. The invitations 
for the London Conference to /)twenty-four nations had no-
minated 16 August as the day upon which the meeting should 
assemble. Egypt refused to attend, claiming that she had 
no intention of submitting jurisdiction of her sovereign 
rights to an international body, neither would she discuss 
60 
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the ma.tter in the terms of the invitation. The British 
Foreign Office, which had issued the invitation, stated 
the aim was "To consider.what steps could most appropri-
ately be taken to establish operating arrangements under 
an international system designed to assure the continuity 
of operation of the canal ••• 11 in accordance with the 1888 
Convention and the "legitimate" interests of' Egypt. 7 The 
other country who refused to attend was Greece, who was 
in serious dispute with Britain over the Cyprus question 
at the time and showed it in this manner. 
The Soviet Union attended the conference, not agree-
ing with the terms of the invitation but, as she claimed, 
1 
i ·-" 
',_/ ...... ,1 \ 
to demonstrate her good will towards peaceful settlement 
of the dispute. Shepilov, the Russian representative, 
had several reservations .to make. Particularly he warned 
against the dangers of military action in the Middle East. 
"One cannot fail to see," he said, "that such a violation 
would not be confined to a local conflict in the area of 
8 the Suez Canal." Russia's other reservation,, which she 
made clear from the outset, was that those powers invited 
to the conference did not fully represent the signatories 
of the 1888 Convention, one of which .:had been the Austro-
Hungarian Empire9 now existent in its constituent forms. 
Thus each of these countries, such as Yugoslavia, Rumanli, 
and.Bulgaria were worthy of invitation. In addition, the 
Arab states, who were the successor.-states to the Ottoman 
. . ~ • J. 
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Empire had not been invited. Finally· the Soviet Union 
claimed that Communist China should be at the conference 
because of her interests as a maritime power. 
As far as the dispute itself was concerned, Russia 
was at pains to stress that the whole matter was simply 
/' 
a "clearcut struggle" between Western "colonialism" and 
Afro-Asian nationalism.9 To emphasize this theme shepi-
lov withdrew the Soviet proposals and threw his support 
behind the Indian plan, as put forward by Krishna Menon, 
the Indian representative. ,The basis of this plan was 
that of recognition of the Suez Canal as an integral part 
of Egypt as well as a waterway of international impor-
. 10 
tance. Briefly the proposal left the canal in Egyptian 
control but also established a body to be known as "The 
Egyptian Corporation for the Suez Canal" which with a 
"consultative body of user interests" would be charged 
with advisofy, consultative and liason functions in rela-
tion to the "Egyptian Corporation". Finally, the Egyptian 
government ~ould transmit to the United Nations the annual 
'' 
report of the corporation. 
But the Western powers were not to be lulled into a 
proposal which only left their interests to be fostered 
at the "consultative" level. Eden said of India's propo-
sal and the stand she took in refusing to adhere to the 
eighteen nations' plan finally approved by the conference: 
"We were sorry that India was out of step with the majority 
62 
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of the conference, which represented more than 95 per 
cent of the tonnage passing through the canal." In at-
tempting to persuade India he says that she was asked 
whether she could at least endorse the principles agreed 
by the eighteen powers. 
unable to do •1111 
Eden reports, "This they felt 
This result is not surprising considering the prin-
ciples involved in the eighteen nations' plan. The re-
sults Eden wanted from the ~irst London Conference he 
describes .as follows: (a) "that it should reach agreement 
by a large majority on the international control of the 
canal." (b) "that it should decide upon the steps to 
take to effect this." These ideas were embodied in the 
proposal of Britain, France, and the United States, which 
had been circulated to those invited to the conference on 
5 August. The proposals would have set up an international 
authority to take over operation of the canal, ensure its 
free and efficient function, arrange for fair compensation 
to the Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company, and ensure 
Egypt nan equitable return" in the light of her "rights 
and interests". This implicitly dismissed Egypt's argu-
ment of her sovereign right to control the canal. 
In this proposal one can see the hand of Dulles as 
well as those of the British and French. If this scheme 
could get the endorsement of the majority of those attend-
ing the conference, the argument ran, Nasser might well 
, 
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accept. But when Prime Minister Menzies of Australia --·.::.~ 
went to Cairo heading a five man delegation to deliver 
the proposals of the conference for an international 
authority, he was met after five days of talks with an 
unqualified refusal on Nasser's part to discuss the mat-
............ 
ter in these terms. Nasser would, however, be willing to 
discuss a revision of the 1888 Convention and would be 
willing to gua-rantee the free and efficient maintenance 
of the canal. 
But before the Menzies mission left for Cairo, Eden 
telegraphed Eisenhower thanking him for the job "Foster" 
had done at the conference and saying how pleased he was 
to achieve in the conference the unanimity they did arrive 
at among the eighteen nations. In addition Eden passed on 
information he had gathered, that Russia's obstructive 
tactics at Lancaster House, the scene of the conference, 
were only part and parcel of an attempt to rid the Middle 
East of Weatern in·fluence. He quoted a "reliable report" 
that at a luncheon Shepilov gave for the Arab ambassadors, 
,, 
the Russian Minister claimed he wanted to see "the abali-
tion of all foreign bases and exploitation" in the Middle 
East •14 Thts attitude, Eden said, presented a serious 
• 
threat to total Western interests in the Middle East. 
"The firmer front we sh.ow together, the greater the cha.nee 
that Nasser will give way without the need for any resort 
to force." 15 Nevertheless, this threat was one of the 
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reasons why.British-French preparation had to continue at 
the military level. Obviously Eden was becoming concernea 
towards the end of August of possible divergences in the 
allies' policy which would play right into both Nasser's 
and Russia's hands • 
.. After the collapse of the Menzies-Nasser talks, Egypt 
proposed all canal users meet in conference to discuss the 
creation of a "negotiation body" charged with examining 
the problems of free passage, development, and tolls. 
Britain and France refused to accept this, declaring·that 
Nasser had been unwilling to negotiate previously (i.e. on 
the basis o~ the Menzies proposals).16 Egypt was sup-
ported in this move by Russia, who in fact had suggested 
the establishment ,of a preparatory commission composed of 
Britain, France, the United States, India, and the Soviet 
Union to draft a new convention agreeable to Egypt and 
the canal users. Mackintosh argues that this move was 
partly based on the fear of Russia being le~ out of an 
accomodation between the West and Egypt in the form of 
the SUez Canal Users' Association {SCUA), which was the 
brainchild of Dulles.17 
The second London Conference·was to meet on 19 Sep-
tember, the basis of discussion to be the SCUA. This was 
.. 
to be an organization "to enable the users of the canal 
.. to exercise their rights", as Eden described it when an-
nouncing the planiin the House of Commons on 12 September.18' 
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This idea was ·in direct line with what we have already 
seen was the Dullesian legal view of the status and rights 
of the users. In his speech announcing the birth of yet 
another attempt at "peaceful settlement", '"Eden said: 
But I must make it clear that if the Egyptian 
Government should seek to interfereoooWith the 
operations of the association, then that go-
vernment will once ,Qre be in breach of the 
Convention of 1888. ~ 
For one embarked apparently upon a course of peaceful 
settlement through negotiation, this sentence could only 
be taken by Egypt as a deliberate attempt to threaten her 
sovereign rights, as she interpreted them. Yet discussion 
went ahead with the idea of the SCUA, although there was 
really very little chance o·f its success. 
SCUA has been described above as Dullesian in con~ 
cept. In a press conference of 13 September 1956 Dulles 
was tackled about the origin of SCUA. In answer to a 
question asking if the origin of the association lay in 
Washington, he replied: 
Well, I will say there has been very intensive 
thought given to this project here in Washington, 
but not just by the Department of Stateo There 
has been very close working cooperation in this 
matter over the last few days with the British and 
French Governments through their Ambassadors.20 
An answer in these terms clearly suggests that the idea 
had muc1l'·to do with Dulles, and there iS little doubt 
that he was its originator. 21 
The basis of SCUA was ·as follows. 22 The three main 
\, 
Western powers, and as much support frontf the first London 
Conference participators possible, would associate • as in 
concert in sailing their own ships through the canal, em-
ploying their own pilots and personnel as necessary and 
receiving the tolls leavied. Egypt would receive a share 
of the revenue and her cooperation would be sought in the 
venture. But there was little hope of success of this 
lawyer's plan for the very good reason, that ultimately. 
the problem was not legal but political. Nasser's action 
of 26 July 1956 was political in motivation, not legal 
(although it took this form), and settlement would have 
to take this factor into consideration. 
The·, British attitude to SCUA was that the suggestion 
was to "deflect the course of events", as Eden put it. 23 
\ 
Eden was adri,sed thatthe legal basis underlying the plan 
had little of the validity that Dulles claimed. There was 
also the problem of how the users' rights should ultimately 
be enforced. By use of force, as Britain and France 
claimed? Or peacefully, as the United States understood? 
Here lay another deep division in the Western camp. Eden 
·~ received a message on 3 September from Presid'nt Eisenhower, 
who told him that "American public opinion" flatly rejected 
the use of force. 24 This confirmed the differences between 
the United States and Britain and France in a manner which 
was eventually to seriously jeopardize the NATO organiza-
t 
tion. Eisenhower's view of the use of force was confirmed 
-,,.., :- la·,' ~ .• s, 
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in a press conference on 11 September, when he stated in 
reply to a question of whether the United States would 
support Britain and France, if they resorted to force: 
" ••• As far as going into any kind of military action under 
present conditions, of course we are not." 25 But Eisen-
hower did admit that if after exhausting peaceful means, 
there should be aggression on the part of Egypt against 
the peaceful use of the Canal, " ••• you might say that we 
would recognize that Britain and France had no other re-
course than to continue to use it even if they had to be 
more forceful than merely sialing through it. • 26 Indeed, 
United States policy must have been difficult for Eden 
and Mollet to unravel! 
.. 
At the second London Conference on 19 September fif-
teen of the eighteen members adopted the SCUA proposals, 
but before definite action had been taken in implementing 
.. 
them, Britain and France decided to refer the matter to 
the Security Council on· 23 September, to consider the si-
tuation created by Egypt in ending a system of interna-
tional control over the canai. 27 
Dulles explicitly confirmed that there were diffe-
rences of opinion between the allies on the use of force. 
He opposed the use of both military and economic sane-
.. 28 
tions. This, of course, played right into Nasser's and 
t Russia's hands. Any hope of a negotiated settlement had 
I 
now gone by, Nasser particularly knowing that forcible 
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aotion of the British and French would not gain United 
States support. He could gamble that even if an attack 
took place without United States backing, the European 
powers could gain but little. If he did so gamble, he 
was correct in this estimate. 
In New York action was .being taken on the British-
French move to bring the matter to the Security Council. 
The debate began on 5 October. Further differences bet-
ween the European powers and the United States occured 
here. Both Dulles and Dag Hammarskjold, the United Na-
tions Secretary General, had resolved to hold the meetings 
in private in order to get down to hard bargaining rather 
than using the United Nations floor as a stage to set up 
moral precepts in an attempt to justify perhaps more ag-
gressive action later. This is what Britain and France 
desired. But at length they were prevailed upon to begin 
the debate in· private. Here again it will be seen that 
not only the strategy, but also the tactics of the Western 
powers were seriously diverging. The,,public sessions of 
the debate saw Britain and France attempting to brand 
Egypt as a criminal, accusing her of violation of her in-
ternational obligations, while Egypt came back with the 
claim that she was neither obliged or willing to accept 
international control such as envisaged in the SCUA pro-
posals of Britain, Fr~ce, and the United States. 
Egypt proposed her plan for the creation of a 
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negotiating body with a set of principles such as reaf-
firmation of the 1888 Convention, free and und,iscrimi-
nating passage, equitable tolls, and so on, included. 29 
During secret sessions of the Council it appeared as if 
some basis for accomodation hqd been reached. The amended 
<O 
British-French proposals as put forward in a subsequent 
public debate were quite close to the set of principles 
for settlement suggested by Egypt. In between formal 
sessions Selwyn Lloyd of Britain, Christian.Pineau of 
France, and Mahmoud Fawzi of Egypt had been closeted in 
the Secretary General's office hammering out, apparently, 
a basis for agreement.30 The eventual failure of action 
in the United Nations and the attacks of the British and 
French upon Egypt caused Dag Hamma.rskjold to reconsider 
his whole policy as Secretary General after the crisis, 
especially as it had been France who had put forward Ham-
I 
marskjold's name for the position of Secretary General in 
1951. 
When the set of agreed principles were presented to 
the Council, they were unanimously approved; but Shepilov, 
the Russian Minister, vetoed the rest of the draft-resolu-
tion which, al though supporting the notion of SCUA, asked 
Egypt to offer alternative ideas in conformity to the set 
~ of principles agreed upon. Thus, by Soviet action Britain 
and France had their moral backing. But Hammarskjold, 
not to be outdone, got the British, French, and Egyptian 
70 
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representatives to agree to meet again in Geneva on 29 
October to continue the discussions in~'lerms of the agreed 
principles. 
This meeting was destined never to take place. Sel-
wyn Lloyd returned from New York to London on 16 October. 
Then he and Eden flew to Paris to confer with Mollet and 
Foreign Secretary Pineua. It was during this time that 
the British and French Ministers probably came to some 
kind of understanding on military action against Egypt. 
Their decision was made easier for them on 29 October 
, 
1956, when Israel attacked Egypt, and following an ulti-
matum the British and French also attacked. 
So peaceful settlement had failed. Dulles also had 
failed to divert the Bri tish-~ench resolve from the use 
of force, al though for a period of nearly three months he 
had successfully sought to bytrack measures into conference 
form. His mental agility is to be admired. His gradual 
erosion of the weapon of common resolve is to be deplored, 
for it amply demonstrated internal di visions in the We~t, 
making the job of Eden and Mollet all the more difficult 
and Egypt's position all the more secure. 
The seeming irony of the whole situation was that in 
spite of the withdrawal of foreign pilots from the Suez 
Canal, passage through the canal was still "functioning 
to the satisfaction of the shipmasters. So far as could 
be d'iscovered there had been no undue delays since the 
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European pilots left! 11 32 Again this demonstrates the 
political nature of the dispute, something which Dulles, 
although probably realizing it, did little to resolve 
through the medium of political solution. 
,. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE CRISIS 
Since the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company 
in July, the British and French governments had been 
building up their forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
29 October 1956 was the day on which Israel attacked Egypt 
and thus precipitated a hectic week to follow in which 
Britain and France were finally to dash what little hope 
there was for peaceful settlement of the dispute. In ad-
dition, they were to bring down upon themselves the accu-
·,. 
,ations of "imperialists" and "aggressors" from all corners 
of the globe; they were to lay open their already weak 
position to an American veto and thus cause a serious 
rapture in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance; and finally, 
they were to allow the Soviet Union to appear as the one 
great power willing to support, not only Egypt, but the 
whole of the Arab world against Western encroachment. -
30 October 1956 saw the delivery of the Anglo-French ulti-
matum to the governments of both Egypt and Israel. The 
ultimatum.1 noted the outbreak of hostilities, pointed out 
that this jeopardized the security of the Su.ez Canal, • ••• on 
which the economic life of many nations depends," and called 
upon the two belligerents to cease hostilities and to with-
draw ten miles on each aide of the canal. In the note to 
Egypt, the latter was requested " ••• to accept the temporary 
occupation by Anglo-French forces of key positions at Port 
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Said, Isrnailia and Suez• • Should this ultimatum not be 
complied with, the Anglo-French forces would intervene in 
order to insure compliance after twelve hours from the 
time of issue of the stat,ement. 
Finer states that to avoid accusations of collusion, 
the British and French forces could not move until the 
ultimatum to Egypt had expired. 2 Nevertheless charges 
were soon1to be brought, particularly by the Labour Party 
in the House of Commons. That there was some foundation 
for the accusations does not seem unlikely, especially 
in the light of the fact that Eisenhower had already im-
pressed upon Ben Gurion that his country would receive no 
support from the United States, if Israel did attack any 
of the Arab states. On 27 October, the Saturday before 
the war began, Eisenhower, just prior to his entering the 
hospital for a pre-election check-up, dispatched a message 
to Ben Gurion. He stated that he was concerned about 
hearing of the mobilization of Israeli troops and renewed 
Dulles' plea that force should not be used, which would 
"lessen the peace and friendship between Israel and the 
United Statts" .3 The following day Eisenhower again cabled 
the Israeli Prime Minister saying this time in stiffer 
terms: "I am compelled to emphasize the degree of appre-
hension I have about the present situation and hope that 
you do nothing to endanger the peace. 114 
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Thus it appears reasonable that Israel would not have 
dared to instigate a major military move ~n the area, know-
ing that the United States would not support her, unless 
"' 
she had the assurance of support from Britain and France.5' 
Nevertheless, Israel had by this time become sufficiently 
wary of the Arab countries, so that in a period of crisis 
it is conceivable that she could act unilaterally, for a 
short time at any rate. The evidence, as subse~uently seen, 
of her·completely successful victory over the Egyptian army 
suggests that she did not overrate her enemy or underrate 
her own ability. In addition, she had had an unpleasant 
precusor of the increasing jeopardy of her position· on· 
23 October. On that day Jordan adhered to the Egyptian-
Syrian defense pact of October 1955~ Thia adherence fol-
lowed elections in Jordan on 21 October, where Nasser's 
influence helped to return a pro-Egyptian parliament. The 
Egyptian General Abdal-Hakim Amr became commander~in-chief 
of the forces of the three countries. Thus Israel had 
considerable justification::in becoming alarmed at her 
"de jure'u encirclement. Her action on 29 October seen 1~ 
this light appears more a preventive move than ene planned 
well ahead in collusion with Britain and France. What is 
apparent is that Britain had warned Israel off attacking 
Jordan because of her, albeit dwindling, influence and 
interests there. However, for whatever reason Israel 
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attacked Egypt, and this inevitably is open to dispute at 
present, the Suez Crisis was brought to its apex. 
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Head of the 
British Foreign Office, accompanied by M. Pineau, the 
French Foreign Secretary, handed the ultimatum to the 
Egyptian Ambassador at 4:15 p.m. on 30 October. At 
4:25 p.m. the ultimatum was handed to the Israeli Chargl 
d'Affaires in London. It was to expire at 4:30 a.m. on 
31 Octoberi b~t at 8:30 p~m. on the day it was delivered, 
Nasser told the British Ambassador in Cairo that he re-
jected, the ultimatum. At the same time Dr. Fawzi, the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister, appealed to the Security Council. 
Washington's reaction to the combined British-French 
action was sharp and decisive. On the morning of 31 Octo-
ber, Eisenhower called Eden and appears to have rebuked 
him severely for what the United States considered was 
{!, 
such drastic action. It is reported that "the Prime Minia-
Ser burst into tears" 7 as 1 t finally became obvious to h:im 
:,.. that the Americans had turned almost completely· against 
their former ally. Eden had been under serious and growing 
pressure both at home and abroad for some· time now. In 
addition he was becoming critically ill. All this was to 
have the effect of eventually breaking his nerve and turning 
the British-French attack upon Suez ., into a fiasco. 
Eisenhower also was under strain, particularly as he 
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was nee.ring the .~end of his election campaign with only 
six days to go before the country went to the polls. On 
the evening of 31 October he went on television to speak 
on the Middle East.8 He outlined the dilemma America had 
been labouring under in her attempt both to support the 
new Israeli state and help the Arabs. He condemned the 
Egyptians' acquisition of arms and pointed out that both 
Israel and the two European powers, France and Britain, 
I" 
had cause to be concerned about their interests. He then 
said of the situation: 
As it is the manifest right of any of these na-
tions to take such decisions and actions, it is 
likewise our right= if our judgement so dictates -
to dissent. We believe these actions to have been 
taken in error.9 
He went on to speak of future United States policy which 
was designed to attempt to settle the matter through the 
United Nations and not, he stressed, to involve the United 
States in the hostilities. He told of how America had 
. attempted the previous day to bring about the close of 
hostilities through the Security Council, the resolution 
being vetoed by Britain and France. But in spite of this, 7 
another attempt would be made via the General Assembly. 
I~ any main point emerged from this, clearly it was a 
public denial of support for Eritish~French action, a 
stand which was to split the NATO alliance and play right 
into the hands of Moscow. 
' 
l' 
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By the evening of 31 October, bombing of certain 
well-defined targets in Egypt had begun by Britain and 
Franceo In reply Egypt had sunk a block ship in the 
canal. lO From the first :Sri tain claimed that her main, 
aim was to ensure the freedom of movement through and the 
safety of the canal. Now it was to be all or nothing. 
The Secru.ity Council's ·decision to carry the matter to the 
General Assembly, as proposed by the Yugoslav member, was 
carried only on the affirmative vote of the United States.11 
The ~esolution was a procedural one and thus not subject to 
a veto, so with the abstention of Britain, France, Austra-
lia, and Belgium the matter was put in the hands of the 
General Assembly.12 
This, of course, Eden did not wish to see happen. In· 
his memoirs, he states that the chance of the matter being 
discussed dispassionately in order to get a settlement was 
all the less probablg in the General Assembly of some 
eighty members than it would be in the Security Council: 
The authors of ihe Charter knew what they were 
about when they charged the Assembly with the 
power to debate and recommend 9 and the Si~urity 
Council with the power to take decisionso J 
He intimates that he regretted that the Assembly was now 
\) 
invited to give orders. Two points emerge from this. 
Firstly, Eden was showing what appears to be a very Eri-
tish prejudice against the conduct of international af-
\ fairs by majority rule. Secondly, his saying that the 
/ 
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matter should have been le~ in th~ hands of the Security 
Council was.no doubt partly stimulated by the knowledge 
that through the veto system, :Sri tain and France could 
very well control the outcome of such deliberations and 
thus forestall any United Nations• moves to stop their 
progress in the canal attack until their ends had been 
accomplished. This was not to be. 
In Britain at this time Eden was faced with increasing 
difficulties. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, resigned from the Cabinet. In the House 
of Commons the Labour Party decided to table a motion of 
censure against the government. The leader of the oppo-
sition, Hugh Gaitskell, declared that he would use "every 
constitutional means ••• to save the country from the disas-
ters which we believe will follow the course set by the 
Government. 014 Ey this time then Eden was in a particu-
larly difficult situation. His support at home was begin-
ning to crumble and was to go on doing so; the Americans 
had stated that they did not approve of his action; the 
matter had gone to the General Assembly, which was almost 
certain to go against him; and finally, by attacking 
Egypt the canal was blocked. 
1 November saw the Labour motion of censure defeated 
in the House of Commons by sixty-nine votes. On the same 
day the United Nations General Assembly decided to take 
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~P the crisis by sixty-two votes to two (Britain and 
France opposing) with seven abstentions. From the United 
States came an attack upon Britain by Du.Iles, who consi-
dered the British-French attack on Egypt "a grave er-
ror ... 15 
The following day, at 2:30 a.m. on the morning of 
2 November, the General Assembly supported and passed a 
resolution urging a cease fire. The resolut·ion had been 
moved by the United States. In addition to urging a cease-
fire and the halting of the movement of military forces 
and arms in the area, the parties were requested to fall 
back to armistice lines and certain steps were to be taken 
in order that the canal might be reopened and freedom· of 
navigation restored.16 Furthermore, the Secretary General 
of the organization was asked to observe and report on 
the compliance with the resolution. Because of the situa-
tion, the Assembly was to remain in "emergency session.• 
The motion had passed sixty-four to five with Britain, 
France, Israel, Australia and New Zealand against, and with 
Canada, South Africa, Belgium, Laos, the Netherlands and 
Portugal abstaining. 
The British Prime Minister had, not surprisingly, 
seen the result of the Assembly's deliberations, so now 
British and French action was going against a resolution, 
specifically aimed at getting the war to cease. If Eden 
was to succeed now, he was to do it by flying in the face 
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of the United Nations. In spite of the resolution, Bri-
tish and French aircraft were still bombing Egypt, the 
object of which, according to "a senior member of the Air 
Staff", subsequently, was to neutralize whatever air 
power the Egyptians had.17 While the bombing was going 
on,.",. the radio station, "The Voice of Britain," was warn-
-
./ 
~-
~· ing Egyptian citizens to keep clear of military installa-
.~ tions and to surrender.18 Is it not plausible to suggest 
that such urgings no doubt served only to bolster up the 
degree of determination held by the Egyptians to fight 
the British and French, if necessary from street to street 
as indeed occured some few days later in Port Said? 
In the United States by 4 November the Administration 
appears to have been resloved to oust Eden from SUez. The 
ini tal reactions of anger had now given way to a "cold 
determination to liquidate the Suez affair at the earliest 
possible moment."19 To do this it was necessary that the 
British, French, and Israelis be driven out of Egypt, and 
the United States policy makers appear to.have taken into 
consideration even the possibility of a full rift within 
the NATO structure. 20 Among the criticisms aimed at Eden 
by the Administration was that he, :hacked the military 
"decisiveness to carry through the expedition to success 
within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, cost what it 
must cost; to his lack of foresight and planning to take 
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care of his back door 0 , 21 the back door being Britain's 
oil reserves at the onset of the campaign, for which in-
alequate provision had been made. 
Certainly there is some possible justification for 
cr1 ticism of the military aspects of the situation. On 
l November reports from what was presumed to be "The 
Voice of Britain" radio station at Limmasol, Cyprt1s, 
broadcasting in Arabic, spoke of allied landings in.Egypt. 
As it turned out, this report was incorrect, for it was 
not until 5 November that British and French paratroopers 
landed at dawn in and around Port Said ~2 That is, it took 
nearly four full days between the initial bombing and the 
initiation of land fighting. What had held Eden up? The 
general staff had been asked to prepare plans well ahead 
of time; consultations with the French had undoubtedly 
been held on the subject. Was it true as the Americans 
said, that he had not laid ou·t "enough" for the operation 
in terms of cost? Or was it, more likely, that his mis-
takes were not military as such, but diplomatic and poli-
tical? Even though Eisenhower was a military man, people 
like General Charles F. Keightley, the British Oommander-
in-Ohief of the Allied !'orces in·i the operations in Egypt, 
were not liable to make such simple military errors. 
Keightley had apparently been told to prepare his plans 
for initiation on about 8 or 9 November. (This date, it 
' ' 
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will be remembered, was after the American Presidential 
election.) He was informed on 30 October that he was to 
start operations; and he has written: 
••• instead of ten days interval between the exe-
cutive order and the start of operations I was 
liable to get about ten hours, and our operations 
might well be quite different to those for which 
we ha.d planned o 2J 
such a change of plans at the last moment could only 
have come about for some political reason. Possibly it 
was because Eden's hand had been forced by the (prema-
ture?) Israeli attack on Egypt 9 especially if this had 
the particular French support it seems to have had. The 
.French dropped supplies, provided moral support on the 
Mediterranean coast of Israel, and kept up air cover for 
the Israeli cities. 24 On the other hand, Eden, seeing 
that the United States was not going to favour him with 
her fu.11 suppor:t, perhaps thought that by premature action, 
. 
especiaJ,1-y in the pre=election period, he might force 
Eise~'6wer• s hand, al though for such an experienced poli-
tician as Eden this seem to be a reason without much 
weight. Eden obviously.knew that the levels of approach 
to the matter of both the SUez Canal and intervention 
were different as between :Britain and the United States. 
He openly rgoognized that: 
It is an obvious truth that the safety of transit 
through the canal 9 though clearly/ of concern to 
the United States, is for them not a matter of 
survival as it is to us and, indeed to all Eu.rope 
',, 
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and many other lands. Indeed, Mr. Dulles himself 
made this clear on Augu.st 28 when he said the 
United States economy is not dependent upon the 
canal.25 
The American administration's criticism of Eden's 
strategy then probably stands; but the military criticism 
., falls in·· as much as it seemed not to take into account 
the political implications. Nevertheless even here a 
certain amount of criticism is valid in relation to the 
cost and extent of the operation. Again the Bri tis.h 
Prime Minister in his memoirs remarks that the allies 
were having difficulty in procuring enough paratroopers 
and carrier craft, and were handicapped with a "crippling 
shortage" of landing craft .. 26 
The next important event occured on 3 November. 
Dulles, who had up to this time carried out the American 
reaction, was admitted to the hospital and was soon ope-
rated on for cancere 27 Thus until 6 November America's 
policy in regard to the events which were to follow were 
in the hands particularly of President Eisenhower, Herbert 
Hoover, Jr., and Henry Cabot Lodge, rather than those of 
Dulles. But in general the affair was conducted in line 
with the policy as laid down by Dulles. 
In London on 3 November Sir Anthony Eden made a 
broadcast t the British public to inform them of"•• .what 
has happened, what the government has done9 and why it has 
done it.•28 In speaking he stressed that the government 
had to take action quickly in order to stem what he described 
LI.I 
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as the danger of spread of a "forest fire•. Of the Common-
wealth and other nations he stated that "in the very nature 
of things" they could not be consulted in time and he hoped 
that just as New Zealand andAAustralia had done, both 
Canade and the United States would see the matter in this 
light. He stressed that Brita.in could not allow a con-
flict in the Middle East to spread because of Britain's 
reliance on oil, of which three-quarters of her supply 
came from this area. He drew the analogy between Nasser's 
present actions and the inter-war years and the danger of 
not rea.cfting swi~ly to them. "There are times for cour-
age, times for action - and this is one of them - in the 
interests of peace. 029 He finished by telling the public 
that Britain had intervened because the United Nations 
could not do so in time, and he hadded that Britain would 
welcome the United Nations taking over her role. 
No doubt the reason in part for this broadcast was 
to stem the tide of public opinion running against the 
government. As we have seen, the opposition in Parlia-
ment had vowed to bring an end to the government 0 s policy, 
and in fact Hugh Gaitskell was to make a broadcast on 
the next day. Nevertheless, according to the opinion 
polls taken in Britain between 30 October and 3 November, 
the opposition did not have the overwhelming support of 
the people. Of all voters, 48.5% supported the 
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government's action in invading Egypt, while 39% opposed 
.. 
it. The remainder expressed no opinion at a11.30 Thie 
suggests that not all the Labour voters V\,ere supporting 
their party's att1tude towards the crisis. To add to the 
government's support, Winston Churchill, who had already 
been appraised of the events,31 wrote a letter to the 
Times showing his accord with Eden's policyo3 2 He stated: 
Unfortunately, recent months have shown us that 
at present it is not possible to hope in this 
area for American cooperation on the scale and 
with the promptness necessary to control events. 
He continued, that the government, although regretting 
the necessity for this course of action against Egypt, had 
had no other alternative. His whole letter was predomi-
nantly aimed at the American alliance, which he regarded 
as "the keystone of our policy", and he was confident 
that this keystone would hold. 
Gaitskell, in his broadcast on 4 November, went over 
~ the Prime Minister's speech point by point, refuting it 
as he did so.33 Regarding the claim of safeguarding the 
canal, he showed that it was the British-French attack 
which led to the blocking of the canal by the Egyptians. 
He further underlined the deep divisions in the country, 
qu.~ting the Archbishop of Canterbury's leading of a depu-
tation of all denominations in protest. The Commonwealth 
.was divided and this was disastrous, for the Commonwealth, 
Gai tskell said, "could have been ••• the greatest force for 
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peace and unity in the world; above all, a bridge between 
East and West, of incalculable value," which had now been 
destroyed. In refuting Eden's claim that the action was 
intended to make way for United Nations• intervention, 
Gaitskell stressed that nothing of this nature had been 
included in the ultimatum to Egypt. "If this was the 
tovernment Os plan," he said 9 ~0why on earth did they not 
put it forward before?" The answer was that Britain thea 
would not have been able to occupy the canal, which, he 
implied, was the government's true aim. He ended by call-
ing for the resignation of the Prime Minister. 
Gaitskell's points of view and the public opinion 
polls then highlight the.internal divergence within Bri-
~' 
tain both at governmental and at public level. Even if 
the figures quoted above did not show a great majority of 
opinion against the Suez action, they certainly did not, 
on the other hand, suggest country-wide support. In a 
democracy such results must demonstrate serious misgivings 
on the part of the people in their government. 
On 4 November when Gaitskell made hie broadcast, the 
United Nations General As~embly issued its second cease 
~----:. 
fire order and at the same time requested the Secretary 
~~~, 
General to submit plans for a peace force. The second 
cease fire order was proposed this time by nineteen Asian 
and African governments, and 1 t was adopted by the General 
BT 
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Assembly by a vote of fifty-nine to five (Eritain, France, 
Israel, Australia, and New Zealand opposing) with twelve 
abstentions.3 4 The resolution re-affirmed that of 2 Novem-
ber and once again called on the parties involved to~~o~ply 
with the provisions of that resolution. The Secretary 
General was to present a plan within forty-eight hours for 
a peace force 10to secure and supervise the cessation of 
hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the afore-
mentioned resolution." 
Meanwhile in Egypt armoured concentrations were bei~g 
bombed and beach defenses, such as mines and anti~aircraf't 
gu.ns, were being reconnoitred. At 8:15 p.m. on the evening 
of 4 November, a message went out to the Commander-in-Chief 
. 
ot Suez, asking "what was the latest time a decision could 
be made to postpone the airborne assault for twenty-four 
hours for political reasons?"35 Was Eden wavering? Cer-
tainly if he was, it was under pressure of several differ-
ent factors. No doubt he was considering the United 
Nations' second resolution call for a cease-fire within 
twelve hours as well as the setting·up of a United Nations 
emergency force. What course of action should be followed: 
Await the arrival of the
1 
United Nations eme~gency force 
,., 
(and thus lose control of the canal completely), adhere 
to the plan for paratrooping forces into the area, or 
abandon the military action on the grounds that British-
French intervention had put an end to the Arab-Israeli 
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confl1ct?36 Finally the middle course of action was 
f 
accepted. Eden sent Eisenhower a cable stating that the 
action must continue, at least while "the United Nations 
·• 
force is being constituted and is being transported to 
the spot. 0 37 Otherwise a "military vacuum" would exist, 
which could not be allowed. After this, Keightley was 
cabled and~told to go ahead with the attack, which he 
did at dawn 1 on 5 November. 
Among the many issues on Eden's mind in making his 
decision must have been a note recently received from 
the Soviet government.38 The Russians had been, pecu-
liarly silent through diplomatic channels since the be-
ginning of the dispute. Except for their statement ift 
the United Nations of 31 October on the aggression against 
Egypt, this was the first note protesting the allied action. 
Reasons for this unusual silence will be surveyed later. 
'• 
The note itself, in addition to protesting against 
the allied attack on Egypt, concerned itself mostly with 
the declaration by the British-French naval command, which 
had declared certain zones in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and Red Sea closed to merchant shipping. This, they 
claimed, was an abrogation of Article l of the Convention 
of 1888 on the Suez Canal, to which Britain and France 
had been signatories. The Article held that the canal was 
to remain open in time of war and peace; such a blockade 
then abrogated this clause by making it impossible to 
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enter the canal. This action, the Soviet government de-
clared, was "an act of aggression, affecting the interests, 
not only of Egypt, but of other states as well." The So-
viet government protested this position and reiterated 
its stand taken in the United Nations. 
In this note, certainly, there was none of'tn~ 
threatening language which was to occur later. But Eden, 
having been accused of "aggression'' might well have se-
riously- weighed this in his evidence for or against the 
continuing of the attack. 
Thus, Eden, having considered all these difficulties, 
had decided to continue with the plan of operation. As 
if to reflect the American disapproval of her allies' 
decisions, indidents on th~ scene of the crisis served to 
harass the British-French military situation.39 Between 
31 October and 4-5 November, the American Sixth Fleet was 
standing by in the area on orders to evacuate Americam 
citizens from Alexandria. Even while the bombing of the 
airfields continued, American· naval units entered Alex-
andria's harbour to fulfill this mission. Thus any chance 
that Britain and France may have had to destroy Egyptian 
naval posture was hampered by American naval presence. 
In addition, when the British and French convoys were 
moving from Malta and Algiers towards Egypt, a report 
circulated that the American government had considered 
placing the Sixth Fleet between the British-French navy 
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and the Egyptian coast. Whether true or not, and 1 ts 
truth is difficult to ascertain, it seems plausible in. 
the light of the other events. For example, American 
aircraft were said to have harassed a French ship which 
had been assisti.ng Israel; they also are reported to 
' \ have attempted to interfere with the rada~ devices both 
over Oypru.s and over the Anglo-French convoys. Keightley 
afterwards stated that the presence of the Sixth Fleet 
added greatly to the difficulties and anxiety of the 
whole operation. 40 If these reports are true, then cer-
tainly the Americans had gone out of their way to show 
their disapproval of British-French policy, and such be-
haviour was almost without precedent in the long amicable 
relationship between the United States and Britain. 
' 
Britain and France then were labouring under extreJD'.,e 
\ 
I 
difficulties both abroad and at home, although France was 
less divided internally than was Britain. The Eden govern-
+ 
ment was itself seriously divided. On 5 November, Sir Ed-
ward Boyle, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, resigned. 
On 6 November, the Prime Minister was under threat of re-
signation on· the part of R. A. Butler, Heathcotec=,Amory 
(Minister of Agriculture), and Sir Walter Monckton (Pay-
master General}, if a cease-fire was not soon affected. 41 
Harold Macmillan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was to 
succeed Eden a~er the crisis as Prime Minister, reported 
a very serious dollar-sterling situation; the cause was 
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partly due to the effect of removal of assets abroad. 
Financiers were operating upon the assumption that there 
was a strong liability of devaluation of the pound ster-
ling because of the financial drain of the war and a 
general apprehension on the part of all nations who used 
42 sterling as their basic currency.~ The United States 
Federal Reserve Bank in Washington was selling some of 
1 ts sterling to avoid losses. Finer reports that ·this 
was in part the result of influence upon George M. Hum-
phrey at the United States Treasury by Herbert Hoover, 
Jr., who, it will be remembered, was heading the State 
Department during Dulles• illness. Besides as a means of 
avoiding loss, this was a very effective leverage on the 
British. On, the morning of 6 November, Macmillan contacted 
Washington requesting support, including help in making a 
call on British quotas in the International Monetary Fund. 
A reply came back at 10 a.m. London time, stating that a 
loan would be mdde available if the British announced a 
cease-fire by midnight. Given this situation, the Chan-
cellor's view was that this condition should be imple-
ment .. ed. 
The financial turmoil, however, was only part of the 
pressure which had been building up, particularly on 
5 and 6 November. It has already been noted that the as-
sault on Egypt had taken place at dawn on 5 November. By 
3 p.m. that day Port Ftlad ·(see Map 1), the town on the 
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eastern side of the entrance to the canal opposite Port 
Said, had been taken. By 3:30 p.m. Port Said's Egyptian 
commander had started surrender negotiations. But the 
Russian Consul in Port Said supported the local Egyptian 
commander in withdrawing the surrender offer and had 
• Russian arms distributed to the civilian population, es-
pecially adolescents. Loudspreaker vans toured the streets 
of Cai)ro, saying that Russian help was coming and that. 
World War III had begun with the bombing of London and 
Paris. Nasser by this time had been able to contact the 
local military commanders and ordered them to continue 
fighting. Ovviously the allied bombing.~ had not complete-
ly been successftll in its attempt to sever commu.nications.
43 
This intervention of the Russian Consul at the scene 
of the attack highlights an interesting set of events to 
which we will now turn our attention - that is,the :fur-
thest Russian interference in the SU.ez Canal crisis since 
the beginning of hostilities. It is this event which is 
generally accepted as being the final pressure on the 
British government, "the hammer blow'', which caused the 
government to come in and order a cease-fire.
44 Prime 
II 
Minister Eulganin on 5 November sent notes to Israel, 
Britain, and France hinting at nuclear retaliation against 
the latter two capitals, if a cease-fire was not ordered 
within twelve hours. He also sent a note to the United 
States proposing joint Soviet-American inte{vention on 
) 
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Egypt's behalf. And he sent a note to the,President of 
the Security Council demanding a meeting of the Council 
to discuss the noncompliance of Britain, France, and Is-
rael with the resolution of the General Assembly pertain-
ing to the issue of withdrawal of the invading forces in 
Egypt. 
These actions were perhaps the most dramatic of the 
whole crisis. Apart from the Soviet note of 4 November 
and the Russian statement in the United Nations on 31 Oc-
tober, which have been previously mentioned, the Soviet 
Union had been peculiarly reticent in speaking out. Part 
of the reason, no doubt, was because they were dealing with 
a erious problems of their own in Hungary, where a popu- · 
larly supported uprising had taken place which had to be 
forcefully suppressed by Soviet divisions and tanks. The 
uprising had started on 23 October and had practically 
been quelled by 5 November. In the light of what had been 
happening in the West, Moscow must have been most per-
turbed to have such an uprising on its hands. 
The Bulganin communication to Eden contained the 
following points. 45 Noting the events in Egypt and the 
General Assembly's resolution, Russia charged Britain, 
France, and Israel with "unprovoked aggression against 
Egypt." In disputing Britain's motives Moscow said that 
instead of preventing the Suez zone from becoming an area 
of military operations as Britain claimed, the attack 
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upon Egypt by the British and French had indeed caused 
it to become an area of military operations. Acknow-
ledging Britain's interests in the canal, the Russians 
did not think this justified military operations against 
the Egyptian people. The two Western powers were then 
- ·accused of using the Suez dispute to cover up greater am-
bitions of a war designed to destroy the national inde-
pendence of the Arab states and to reconstruct a colonial 
regime. Then Moscow issued her veiled threat of rocket 
retaliation by comparing Britain's attack on Egypt to 
Britain being attacked by "rocket weapons''.• How would 
Britain feel then, was the question. Finally Bulganin 
informed Eden of his approach to the United States for 
joint action with her to stop the British-French-Israeli 
war upon Egypt, He concluded 9 "We are fully determined 
to crush the agg{essors by use of force and to restore 
peace in the East." 
The letter to M. Mollet was couched in similar terms. 46 
In addition, the French President was asked: "What has 
., 
(French] socialism in common with the predatory armed at-
tack on Egypt, which is an open colonial war?" How could 
Mollet reconcile his socialist views with the attack upon 
a newly independent state "which has not enough arms for 
its defense?" Again, through the interrogative the threat 
of nuclear retaliation was implied: "In what situation 
would France find herself were she attacked by other states 
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that have modern formidable means of destruction?" Like 
Britain, France was called upon to desist, was told of 
Moscow's approach to the United States, and Moscow ex-
pressed the wish that France would "draw the appropriate 
conclusions. 11 
In the letter to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, the 
State of Israel was accused of being warlike, a perpetra-
tor of "fake assurances" and "an instrument of outside 
imperialist forces ... 47 She was accused of blunting the 
"vigilance" of her neighbours, while preparing for attack 
by the assurances of peaceful intent. The Israeli govern-
ment was playing with the fate of its own people by 
"fulfilling the will of others, and acting on instruc-
tions from abroad ••• " The Soviet Union expected Israel 
to change her mind "while there is still time" and with-
draw. In conclusion Israel was told that the Russian 
ambassador had been instructed to leave Tel Aviv and re-
turn to Moscow. 
These then were the three letters to the bellige-
. rents, all of them condemning the action and each· of them 
threatening punitive reaction in one way or another. 
Different in content and manner was the address to Presi-
dent Eisenhower. Highlighting the situation in Egypt, the 
-. 
Soviet government called for "decisive actions on the part 
of the United Nations." 48 Otherwise, the United Nations 
would lose prestige and collapse. The Soviet Union and 
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the United States, both members of the Security Council 
and both atomic powers, had a responsipility to restore 
peace in the area. Then came the startling proposal for 
joint action, startling firstl~because of its novelty, 
and secondly because of its timing. This note-was de-
livered when Eden was in his weakest position and while 
Eisenhower was growing more d.etermined to put a stop to 
Britain's antics, the extent of which might well embt-oi_l 
American nuclear power against the Russians. Here then 
was the Russian proposal for joint action, which reversed 
the second consideration, in theory at least. 
Bulganin said: 
Premier 
Mr. President, in these ominous hours when the 
lo~iest moral principles ••• are being put to the 
test 9 the Soviet government proposes to the go~ 
vernment of the United States of America the 
establishment of close cooperation in order to 
curb aggression and end further bloodshed. 
Ra.ssia further proposed that America's "strong navy in 
the Medite;ranean zone" be used with the Soviet air force 
and navy to crush British-French-Israeli action, in fact 
"for the pooling of their efforts in the United Nations 
~ 
for the adoption of resolute measures to curb aggression~ 
The message, coming as it did one day before the 
election, must have caused Eisenhower considerable an-
\ 
xiety, especially as he had to answer this note knowing 
of the existence oftthe other three less conciliatory 
.· i-,'.,~ 
notes that Moscow had sent to Britain, France, and Israei. 49 
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The reception of the Russian notes in the White 
House, according to one authority, was that: "They were 
~·· 
all terrified."50 The President even thought the letter 
was an ultimatum.51 Finer claimed that alarm spread 
through all of them including the President, Herbert 
Hoover, Jr., and Herman Phleger, who was representing the 
State Department. The President, basing his theory on 
the Russian letter as an ultimatum, "counselled the need 
for readiness for an allout war the moment such an inten-
' tion became evident." 52 This set of circumstances is 
hard to confirm. Robert Murphy in his subsequent memoirs 
states categorically that he was not of the opinion that 
the Russians were serious about their threats. 53 He 
writes: "I don't believe that if Britain and France had 
persisted, and had succeeded in a~hieving their objective 
without long delay, there would have been direct Russian 
intervention." Eden states that his reaction was that 
"the threats in Marshal Bulganin's note need not be taken 
literally."54 
Similarly in Paris the re9:j!tion was to minimize the 
Soviet threat relying on the fact that guarantees of Ame-
rican help were the basis of the NATO, although the United 
States had not specifically confirmed such action in this 
case. ~therm.ore, wagering on forty-eight to seventy-two 
hours for room to manoeuvre, especially with Russia tied 
down in Hungary, the French argued that the matter would 
. ' '.,·. ·.· 
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have become consolidated by then, either w1 th an American 
guarantee forthcoming or an allied agreement to withdraw, 
both of which occured.55 
Ben Gurion replied to the Russian note on 7 November, 
denying that Israel was the lackey of any state, and st.ated 
that she had acted in the capacity of self-defense parti-
. " 
cularly against the "fedayeen" raids and constant threats 
from Egypt inclunding the latter's denial to Israel of 
access rights through the canai.56 
But Washington, it seems, did take the threats some-
what more seriously. In part it was this reception of 
Bulganin's note which eventually made Eisenhower insist 
on British-French withdrawal. In addition, Charles E. 
Bohlen, the United States Ambassador in Moscow, who was 
highly regarded by the President, sent a cable recommend-
ing the quickest possible cease-fire. These factors "de-
cided the issue", as Finer puts it; "Britain, France, and 
Israel must be brought to heel immediately. 1157 
The President's reply to Mr. Bulganin's letter, as 
set forth in a White House statement on the matter,58 
said that the Russian Premier was attempting to divert 
attention from Hungary onto the Suez situation. The 
state of affairs in the Middle East was in the hands of 
·the United Nations and should be left to be handled ex-
clusively by th.:it body. Explicitly stated was the idea 
that "Neither Soviet nor any other military forces should 
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now enter the Middle East area except under United Nations. 
mandate." Further, should the ''introducing of new forces" 
be attempted, it would be a violation of the United Na-
tions Charter and therefore a duty of every United Nations 
; 
~~· member, including the United States, "to oppose any such 
effort.•• Finally, only when Russian troops had been with-
drawn from Hungary would it be "seemly" for the Soviet 
Union to suggest steps toward ensuring peace. The Ru.ssian 
offer was rejected .out of hand. 
As far as action is concerned, little was left ex-
cept for Eden to declare a cease-fire, as demanded by the 
United· States, at midnight on 6 November. We have seen 
something of' the pressures that the latter country was 
able to bring upon the British Prime Minister, who in 
turn weighed heavily against the French will to continueo 
According .to an account by Herman Finer, an exchange took 
place between Eden and Mollet in which the former pre-
vailed upon the latter to declare a cease-fire.59 Eden 
--,,;:: 
said to Mollet, "We must have a cease-fire. We've almost 
won what we went after. Nasser cannot last long now!" 
Mollet, with tears in his eyes, begged Eden to be tena-
cious for another few hours so that the forces could reach 
Suez. "We are in a posture for success. We don't want 
the expedition to have been useless. How can we abandon 
the Israelis?" But Eden, on the telephone, said: 
I' 
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r· am concerned! I can •t hang on. I am being 
deserted by everybody. My loyal associate 
Nutting has resigned as Minister of State. I 
oan°t even rely on unimity among the Conserva-
tives o The Archbishop of Canterbury 9 the 
Church~ the oil businessmen~ everybody is 
against meY The Commonwealth threatens to 
break up o Nehru says he vtrill break the ti es. 
Canada~ Australia are no longer following us 
in our policy o I cannot ID&r:the grave=digger 
of the Crowno And thens, I want you to under-
stand~ Eisenhower phoned me o I can° t go it alone 
without the United States o It would be the first 
time in the history of England ••• No, it is not 
possible. 
The cease-fire was to be declared at 11: 59 p .m. on 6 
November. Even then both Britain and France thought their 
troops were further up the canal than El Cap, some thirty-
five kilometers inland. It appears that communications with 
Keightley were at fault. 
In his telephone call with Mollet, Eden mentioned 
and stressed the call he had recently received from Eisen-
hower. The telephone call was made on the early morning 
of 6 November. Finer reports that the gist of the phone 
call to Eden was that Eisenhower demanded a cease-fire at 
once and that he could not wait any longer. Ed en was to 
do this if he wanted "to preserve the Anglo-American soli-
darity as well as peace. 1160 Other observers report that 
it was this telephone conversation which finally broke 
Eden. Drew Pearson ''stated flatly that the President used 
barrack room language over the telephone in talking to 
Prime Minister Eden and so broke him that he telephoned 
Premier Mollet in Paris within two minutes and ealled off 
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the invasion. 1161 Again, Beverley 13axter writing in 
Maolean°s Magazine of Canade wrote that "one of the best 
informed men in British politics told me that Eisenhower 
had given Eden absolute hell" on the telephone. 62 
At midnight on 6 November a cease-fire under the 
.. sponsorship of the United Nations was declared. This came 
some forty-eight hours before General Stockwell, the local 
comma.nder, had expected to capture Port Said, Ismailia, 
and Suez.63 As it was, only Port Said plus a small strip 
of the canal, as already noted, were in allied hands at 
midnight on: 6 November. That afternoon there had been 
street to street fighting in Port Said and the Egyptian 
soldiers had discarded their uniforms for civilian clothes, 
hence creating more dificulties for the attackers, but by 
dusk the city was in allied hands. 
By this time Eisenhower had been re-elected by "the 
greatest landslide in American history. 1164 13ri tain and 
France and Israel had ceased fighting and the United Na-
''l 
I 
tions Emergency Force was being constructed to ~ake over. \ 
' In Britain, polls on 5 ~nd 6 November had shown t~at 
51.5% of those polled supported the government action, 
while 36% ,pposed it. Eden°s leadership, which on 1-2 No-
vember had satisfied 47% and dissatisfied 41%, now showed 
the returns as 57% and 35% respectively 9 65 Public opi-
nion was veering towards the· government, as o~en occurs 
in a time of crisis, and Britain sat back to lick her 
,' . ,i_. 
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wounds. 
Robert Murphy has echoed the criticism of Eden not 
following the whole attack through until his objectives 
were reached. He has written: 
But to the amazement of many Americans including 
myself, when the operation seem about to achieve its goal 9 Prime lVIiniste56Eden decided to quit '.;~-short of the objectiveo 
'·-i 
Should this have been a true reflection of the Dulles-
Eisenhower practice, i.e. of keeping high State Depart-
ment officials such as Murphy uninformed, then the cease-
fire must have come as a surprise. But this attitude 
;, does strike one as a little naive, in as much as it 
seems to have been the avowed policy of the United States 
firstly, to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, and 
secondly, having failed bring them to a speedy conciusion 
in the light of her own global strategic and politic\1 
dictates rather than paying any heed to the local and 
therefore tactical aims~of Britain, France, and Israel 
in the Middle Eastern area. 
Eden at least, although a major protagonist in~ 
this episode, wrote later: 
The United States government had engaged their 
authority in the lead against us and would not 
'. have been appeased had Anglo-French forces oc-
cupi~d more of the canal or even the whole of it .6~, 
-·-. __ .-,, 
Britain, France, and Israel withdrew from their at-
tack on Egypt somewhat· divided in terms of gains. Britain 
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and France, whose aims had been (A) to create a series 
of·· conditions inside Egypt under which Nasser would fall 
from power, (B) to control the canal, (C) to keep the 
canal open, had failed. None of these three aims was 
attained by the two European powers. Israel, whose aim 
was to drive. the Egyptians back through Sinai and defeat 
them, succeeded admirably. In addition she obtained ac-
cess to the Gulf of Aqaba through the very strategically 
located port of Eilat. Seeing that the Suez Canal was 
closed to Israeli shipping, such an outlet would be of 
extreme value to the Israeli economy, for it provided ac-
cess to the Red Sea and therefore to the East African 
coast and the Indian 6cean. 
A number of questions remain as to Russia's position 
during the immediate crisis. Firstly, it is argued here 
that Russia awaited the reaction of the United .. States to i 
the triple attack on Egypt before deciding on her policy. 
Then, seeing to her great delight and possibly.-Jsurprise, 
that the United States was more fearful of Russian involve-
ment in the Middle East than she was of the possible fall 
of Nasser and re-assertion of British-French influence 
in Egypt, and therefore in the Middle East, the Soviet 
Union proceeded to join the United States in demanding 
allied withdrawal, hinted attack with nuclear weapons, 
and roused fears of "volunteers" to be sent to Egypt. 
Thes·e "volunteers" had first been mentioned in Augu.st, 
•.. 
•. •1 
and again the idea was revived on 10 November. A state-
ment was published in Moscow which suggested that if Eri-
tain, France, and Israel refused to withdraw, the "volun-
1; 
teers" would be allowed to go to Egypt to help against 
the "aggress9rs 11 • 68 
It seems plausible that a good deal of Russian action 
can be attributed to her problems in Hungary. Also, once 
she saw which way America was going to go, she increased 
pressure on the attackers in the only way she could outside 
of the United Nations. The threat of atomic attack raises 
two main points. Firstly, how serious were the Russian 
threats? Secondly, how seriously were they taken in Wash-
ington? In answer to the first query it is probably that 
these threats were part of the diplomatic game, rather 
than an expression of an actual intention to attack London 
,.• 
/ 
and Paris. This appears to be a likely explanation, be-
cause the sovereign integrity of Egypt was worth only a 
little to Russia as compared with the probabl~ cost of a 
nuclear attack, to which there most likely would have 
been some form of reply in kind by the United States. 
Nevertheless, the threat was worth a gamble. America had 
amply demonstrated her decision to halt the war. Russia 
had very little to lose by the rocket-rattling technique. 
The United States, on the other hand, as has been 
demonstrated, seemed to take the Russian threat more se-
riously than the other powers. Again, part of the reason 
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is that should there be even an element of plausibility 
in the Russian resolve, then it would be the United States 
which would hear the brunt of such a war. This point as-
sumes that in this case America would be forced in the 
last resort to support her allies against Russia. In 
fact, as has been noted, Eisenhower's reply to Bulganin's 
note suggests that this would have been so. Any Russian 
movement into the area would have been opposed forcibly. 
The British-French had been awkvvard alliEes for the United 
States in this crisis, but they.were probably not viewed 
by Washington as beyond the pale. The Russian atomic 
threat was not the main reason for America insisting upon 
withdrawal, but the timing of the Russian note was such 
that it sealed American resolve to end the war, possibl·y-
somewhat sooner than would otherwise have occured. 
A problem arises in the hypothetical case of America 
supporting her allies in the Suez venture. What would 
the Russian position have been in this case? Atomic 
threats would then have been of little avail, because the 
United States would have been all the mo~e willing to de-
fend the European powers, and Russia would have known of 
/,/---.,~ \~ her posi_tion beforehand. The Soviet Union wo@ld )j)robably 
have brought forth her threats of volunteers somewhat ear-
lier than she did. In this case there would ha~e been a ' . 
possibility of some form of escalation with the serious 
. ,. ,, .... --·,,, ... , .. ,.~- ~~ .......... ~·~':"'"';",- . . ,.,--,·· ....... . 
. ,. ,_" ~ ,. •. ,_, ,- ' , . 
106 
.9', 
potentialities involved. No doubt escalation -would have fl\~,-
been more than likely in the light of the turbulent feel-
ing of the Arab states and the proximity of-Europe, which 
would be held as hostage by the Soviets. 
1;-. 
l But this was no~ to be. The Soviet Union and the 
United States were not exactly on the same side in· the 
SU.ez crisis, but at least there was a point of common 
coincidence where their two political and strategic spec-
trums ran together. In addition, their reactions demon-
strated their condern for the global strategic rather 
than the local implications of the problem. Each wished 
to bring the war to an end before it involved other po-
/ 
were, while Russia was also willing to make propaganda 
hay in the Middle East while events moved in her favour. 
l · 
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